BackThe fine art of brinkmanship
It could be said that both the AAP and the Congress were looking for the opportune moment to make the coalition fall
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The resignation of Arvind Kejriwal after the failure of his government to introduce the Jan Lokpal Bill is the latest in a series of brinkmanship manoeuvres by the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). While brinkmanship is the oldest gambit in politics, it is being served in brand new bottles by the AAP. It’s time we brushed up our knowledge on the grammar of this ancient art.
Brinkmanship is the gradual escalation of mutual harm. It is a series of threats and counter-threats which if carried out would lead to very bad outcomes for all concerned. This process is voluntarily undertaken by the parties involved in order to compel the other to a certain course of action. The AAP hopes to achieve its anti-corruption crusade through this means. Once in a while, brinkmanship can end up badly with both parties refusing to back off and the eventuality harmful to all actually coming to pass. Indeed, the most successful threat is that which does not need to be carried out.
The important thing to note about brinkmanship is that a lot depends on what one thinks is the risk appetite, or resolve to win, of the other party. If with a high probability the other party is a pushover, then it makes sense to issue an ultimatum. On the other hand, if the other party has a huge appetite for risk, it is best not to issue a threat.
If a threat can be revoked then it loses its efficacy as an instrument of compellence. The threat must involve a real risk of mutual harm in order to work. However, in practice, people don’t know the nature of the other party precisely. So they cannot afford to commit to threats right at the start for fear that they may actually have to carry them out. So the early stages of the brinkmanship episode is called the zone of exploration, where people gauge the risk appetite of others by issuing probabilistic threats—threats that carry a risk of being carried out if compliance does not occur, but which leave the possibility of pulling back open.
In a stand-off between two countries, statements of denunciation, complaints lodged in international tribunals, and troop movements represent varying levels of threat. In the case of large organizations like political parties or armies, once a threat is issued, the risk of having to carry out the threat cannot be eliminated due to internal differences of opinion, bureaucratic procedures, or even accidents. History is replete with near accidents with potentially dire consequences following postures of aggression by top leadership. In the US blockade of Cuba in the 1960s, it was revealed that a Soviet submarine crew, warned to surface when approaching the quarantine line, considered firing a nuclear tipped torpedo with two of the three approvals required coming through.
If the other party shows no sign of backing down, then either one is up against a resolute foe, or the risk inherent in the threat is not sufficient to make even a soft opponent comply. So, one increases the risk of the threat. One of the ways to increase this risk is to communicate that the matter is now out of your control and you will be unable to pull back even if you wanted to. Think of an army burning bridges behind them to signal commitment. At some point the issuer of the threat has to ask if it is worthwhile to continue escalating the threat. Given the increasing probability they are up against a hardliner they may want to stop escalating the situation. Thus while lack of control is important in brinkmanship to convey the reality of the threat, escalation of risk must take place in a controlled way to avoid matters going too far.
Meanwhile the other party is also courting mutual disaster by holding firm. It is also signalling its own resoluteness to compel a possible soft opponent to back down. But with every passing moment, it is also increasing the risk to itself from the chance that it is up against an implacable enemy who will stay the course. At some point it may have to start defusing the tension by agreeing to discuss the matter, and making small concessions. If the matter does not blow over, then depending on whether they prefer to go down with guns blazing or live to fight another day, they should hold firm or give in.
Usually, neither side wants to either give in (and spoil their chances for future encounters) or end up in disaster. So games of brinkmanship are often concluded with face-saving manoeuvres as in the case of the AAP dharna on the issue of the Delhi Police. The important skills for those involved in such episodes are the ability to escalate risk in a controlled way, the ability to conceal one’s own desire for a compromise, and the talent for finding midway solutions that work for both parties, without appearing to have given in.
This brings us to the episodes involving the AAP. The interesting aspect of this encounter is that it is not clear if the AAP wanted to continue to stay in power on its own terms or go down in a blaze of glory, as it did—either to further the cause of anti-corruption, or advance their electoral prospects. At some point, for the Congress, the downside from buckling in terms of the greatly magnified image of the AAP would have become greater than the upside of keeping the BJP out of power in Delhi. The BJP too did not want to take on the risk of the AAP acquiring an even more glorified position in public perception. The BJP had to protect its turf both in the state of Delhi and the national election. In a certain sense, it could be argued that both members of the coalition that has ended were looking for the opportune moment to make it fall.
Rohit Prasad is an associate professor of economics at MDI, Gurgaon.
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