Banking ordinance opens up Pandora’s box
It does not change the status quo, where good money is thrown after bad and no real resolution of NPAs takes place
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The recently promulgated Banking Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance is aimed at resolving the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the banking sector. It creates an illusion of state action, and does little by way of addressing the real concerns. We highlight some of the problems created by the ordinance.
Resolution of NPAs is a two-stage process. The first stage involves assessing the viability of the debtor’s business. The second stage involves deciding whether the debtor’s company should be restructured or liquidated. Any such resolution, be it restructuring or liquidation, imposes losses on the banks that had lent money to the corporate debtor. The larger the losses, the higher the amount of capital needed by the banks to meet the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) guidelines on provisioning requirements. While the government has promulgated the ordinance, it has not made any commitment of additional capital to support the resolution efforts. Capital allocated for the banking sector in the 2017-18 Union budget, or as part of the mid-term capital infusion plan, falls short of what the banks collectively need.
In absence of additional capital, the RBI’s directions to the banks under the ordinance may impede the resolution process. The RBI may have no option but to direct the banks to extend lifelines to unviable companies to defer the problem to a future date. This can happen as part of the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) or otherwise. As pointed out in the Economic Survey 2016-17, over the last few years, cash flows of the large stressed companies have been declining. Restoring their viability necessitates loan write-offs. For the banks, resolving these cases requires the most capital. Given the lack of capital, banks could be given the regulatory cover under the ordinance to refinance these large corporate debtors. We have already seen this happen under the RBI’s corporate debt restructuring (CDR) mechanism. The ordinance does not change the status quo where good money is thrown after bad and no real resolution of NPAs takes place.
Second, resolving a bank’s NPAs requires resolving the entity to which money has been lent. The ordinance may instead create perverse outcomes. Under IBC, banks as members of the creditors’ committee are required to vote on a resolution plan. If the RBI directs a bank to initiate IBC action against a corporate debtor, it may also have to direct the bank on the decisions in the creditors’ committee. By empowering the RBI to act, the government has taken away any incentive of the banks to act on their own. In India today, different banks are at different levels of capital adequacy. An IBC resolution plan that works for one bank may be inimical to the interests of another. As the banking regulator, RBI is responsible for the health of all banks. So it is possible that the resolution plan that finally gets approved by the banks under RBI’s directions will focus more on the health of the banks as opposed to addressing the insolvency of the corporate debtor. This defeats the purpose of an IBC resolution.
Third, RBI giving directions on the resolution of banks’ NPAs may undermine the IBC process in other ways too. It may thwart the incentives of third parties which would have otherwise been willing to offer their bids or resolution plans in a market-driven process.
Fourth, with the ordinance in place, all eyes are now on the RBI to resolve the NPAs of the banking sector. This could be problematic because the range of actions that the banks can take to address the problem is limited by the shortage of capital. The tools available to RBI are limited. If the RBI intervenes on a case-by-case basis, questions about conflict of interest, regulatory capacity and capability will arise. If RBI intervenes through general rules and conditions, this will be no different from the corporate debt restructuring (CDR) mechanism, the strategic debt restructuring (SDR) scheme, and the scheme for sustainable structuring of stressed assets (S4A) that have failed in the past to resolve the problem. Either way, the ordinance puts RBI’s credibility and reputation as a micro-prudential regulator at stake.
Fifth, non-commercial factors may also be at play when it comes to resolving the large NPA cases. In the absence of clarity on the rationale behind the ordinance, we conjecture that one reason banks have not been initiating resolution proceedings against the large stressed companies is because of pressure from politically connected promoters. The ordinance gives banks the regulatory cover to take resolution-related decisions but it is not clear whether it also gives the required political cover. If the RBI is to now get directly involved in these loan restructuring decisions, or indirectly through committees reporting to it, this would put it in a difficult spot.
Finally, public and private sector banks have non-government shareholders, and non-bank creditors. So do companies that may get referred to the IBC following RBI’s directions to the banks. Any action under the ordinance that adversely affects the interests of these parties may be litigated in court. In a litigation if courts take cognizance of the rights of private shareholders and rule in their favour, this can further weaken the IBC process. Also private parties, domestic and foreign, may view this as state interference in market processes. This may affect their future investment decisions.
The ordinance was presumably brought about because banks on their own could not trigger IBC proceedings against the stressed companies for fear of investigation and prosecution, or due to lack of capital or because of challenges in negotiating with politically connected promoters. The ordinance gives banks the regulatory cover to take resolution decisions, but it is, by design, limited in its capacity to resolve the crisis. It opens up a pandora’s box of new problems. Most importantly it puts the RBI in a difficult spot and makes the IBC vulnerable to potential abuse. It also creates the problem of misaligning creditors’ and debtors’ incentives farther away from an effective resolution.
Rajeswari Sengupta and Anjali Sharma are, respectively, assistant professor of economics and consultant at the Finance Research Group at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research.