BackBetween bad and terrible in Syria
US actions are unlikely to either prevent future chemical attacks or resolve the long-running imbroglio
Premium(Vahid Salemi/AP)
As the world braces itself for a likely unilateral limited and narrow act by the US to punish the Bashar Assad regime in Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons against its own population, these actions are unlikely to either prevent future chemical attacks or resolve the long-running imbroglio. In fact, when it comes to Syria, the choices range from bad and terrible.
Although Syria categorically denied possessing chemical weapons in its declaration to the United Nations 1540 committee (set up in 2004 to assist states in preventing non-state actors, including terrorist groups, from getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons), the veracity of this has not been borne out. In fact, there is growing evidence that the Assad regime used chemical weapons on several occasions before the most recent incident.
Consequently, if international norms against the use of such deadly weapons are to be upheld, then the UN Security Council and its five permanent (P5) members are obligated to take appropriate action. Sadly, the council and the P5 have not only been disunited and inconsistent in their approach to such violations but in some cases have even been complicit.
For instance, when Iraq blatantly used chemical weapons against Iran and its own population between 1984 and 1988, the first such use since the end of the Second World War, the Council took no action despite overwhelming evidence. In fact, France, Britain and the US were reluctant to criticize Iraq’s use on account of geopolitical considerations then (recent declassified documents reveal that US intelligence might have even been complicit in Iraq’s chemical attacks against Iran). Not surprisingly, similar considerations are going to determine Russia’s reluctance to endorse UN actions on Syria now.
While the 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention strengthened the norm against their use, it was abused by the spurious evidence deployed by the Bush administration to justify their 2003 military action, unauthorized by the Council, against Iraq. This was particularly damaging because by all accounts, the UN inspections had successfully disarmed Iraq’s chemical arsenal by the late 1990s. Thus, the 2003 preventive war closely linked action against deadly arsenals with regime change. This legacy has come to haunt the Obama administration.
The questionable legitimacy of any unilateral (or coalition of the willing) notwithstanding, the possible military action might prove to be too little, too late and too dangerous for a number of reasons. First, the operation will probably be confined to attacks using aircraft and missiles against military and command and control targets, aircraft and missile, rocket and artillery sites. However, given all the notice, Syria has most probably already dispersed these assets and/or is already prepared to operate without them. Thus, these attacks might destroy most but not all the retaliatory capability.
Second, the operation is unlikely to target the chemical arsenals directly as this cure might spread the disease given the grave danger of fallout of chemical agents among the population. This will leave Assad’s chemical arsenal intact. Third, in light of this, it is unlikely that Assad would be chastened by a single limited military strike; this is also the lesson from other similar limited unilateral strikes. Finally, and perhaps, the worst outcome would be if the limited military strikes were to inevitably bring down the Assad regime. Without boots on the ground, (a promise Obama might regret as much as the red line), to secure the chemical arsenal, these weapons would likely fall into the hands of the fractious anti-Assad and extremist groups.
The only sliver of hope might be for the P5 and other key countries, including India, to use the upcoming G-20 summit in Moscow to forge international unity and work through the UN to find a permanent solution to the Syrian quagmire and get rid of its chemical weapons. Anything else will simply not be effective.
W. P. S. Sidhu is a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University. He writes on strategic affairs every fortnight.
Comments are welcome at otherviews@livemint.com.
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