In February 1968, Time magazine carried a cover story about a Russian admiral, grudgingly respected by Americans as one single-handedly responsible for building a derelict Soviet navy into an aggressive, disciplined and a formidable force, capable of challenging the hitherto unquestioned US maritime dominance.
Russia’s naval history had been tumultuous, with early rulers like Peter the Great and Czarina Catherine building it into the third largest naval force behind only the English and the French for most of the 19th century. While formidable in numbers, the navy was largely ceremonial and untested, and this lack of battle proficiency cost them dearly in their first major conflict with the Japanese in 1904-05 off the island of Tsushima. Admiral Togo of Japan first pinned the Russian Pacific fleet at Port Arthur and then routed and sunk their entire Baltic fleet of 37 vessels, which had been sent as reinforcement, in a humiliating battle.
At the beginning of World War II, the Russian navy was little more than a rag-tag bunch of ships that seldom strayed from the coasts. Since the Red Army played the dominant role in Russian conflicts, Soviet navy had been neglected until Stalin took over and embarked on a major build-up. However, most of the Soviet vessels were still under construction when they were overrun by the advancing Germans during World War II. It was during this raging battle to protect Crimea that a young naval captain named Sergey Georgiyevich made his mark protecting the oilfields of the Caucasus.
Even as a young officer, Sergey showed the capabilities of fleet-building for which he would be renowned later. Welding turrets from T-34 tanks, Sergey modified motorboats into gunships, harassing the advancing Germans and in the process catching the attention of two generals fighting in the same area, who would go on to play important roles in Russia’s destiny—Leonid Brezhnev and Nikita Khrushchev.
Sergey became Russia’s youngest admiral, when he was just 31, and went on to reshape and guide the Soviet quest for oceanic supremacy for several decades, as the chief of its navy. He realized that to build a strong navy, Russia needed not just a complement of ships, destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines, but also affiliations with countries along the theatre of operations who would provide berthing, refuelling and rearmament facilities. For this, he embarked on a series of relationship-building visits to countries and established refurbishment arrangements in ports as distant as Cuba, Angola, Yemen and several Middle Eastern countries.
Appreciating that Soviet engineering was still behind American, especially in submarine and nuclear propulsion technology, Sergey offset this disadvantage by leveraging Russian strength of numbers and its political system. He enhanced Russia’s sea presence by developing thousands of merchant ships that could be transformed into military missions with minimal conversion. He also co-opted over 4,000 Russian fishing vessels into the navy, tasking them with the responsibility of logistics and gathering intelligence while they were out fishing. The Soviet Union also had the largest oceanographic fleet whose ships were tasked with gathering militarily valuable information like depths, currents and lurking spots.
Perhaps the most important change that Sergey brought into his forces was an infusion of aggressive spirit. Despite being numerically and qualitatively inferior, Soviet ships and submarines started stalking American carrier groups, at times coming dangerously close and even passing through US formations. This surface and underwater stalking games taught the Soviets valuable lessons about their adversaries’ strengths, weaknesses, drills and strategies. As a matter of fact, the Soviets nicknamed their own Mediterranean fleet after the US Sixth Fleet from whom they learnt so much.
Admiral Sergey Georgiyevich went on to become that rare legendary warrior who not only inspired his contemporary generation, but influenced the Soviet Naval doctrine for several decades, evolving doctrines of power projection and sea control halfway across the globe in the Arabian Peninsula and Vietnam.
When Admiral Sergey died, Soviet Union renamed one of their largest aircraft carriers, the Baku, in his honour as Admiral Sergey Gorshkov. It is this redoubtable carrier of history that has been rechristened as INS Vikramaditya upon its commissioning into the Indian Navy. When the vessel docks in India, it will be reminiscent of her namesake who had visited India in the 1960s in one of his missions to cement India-Soviet relationship.
Sailors believe that all vessels have a spirit of their own. If that is true, then the Indian Navy has acquired more than just a weapons platform. It also has the reminder to learn from the legacy of a warrior who elevated the Soviet navy from its position of second fiddle to the Red Army to becoming the primary rapier of Soviet foreign policies.
Gorshkov’s strategies have much learning for India, where too the Navy has historically been a relatively neglected arm. India, too, must realize that building a navy requires more than just acquiring vessels. While India’s traditional threats have been land-based, its future aspirations must appreciate the strategic importance of its vast coastline, its offshore areas of interest and the shift of centre of gravity from land-based operations in its north to power projection into the real blue ocean. As Gorshkov often quoted, every potentate who uses only ground forces has but one hand. Yet, whoever uses a powerful navy, has both.
Raghu Raman is a commentator on internal security, member of the www.outstandingspeakersbureau.in and author of Everyman’s War (www.fb.com/everymanswarbook). The views expressed are personal.
Catch all the Business News, Market News, Breaking News Events and Latest News Updates on Live Mint. Download The Mint News App to get Daily Market Updates.