BackInternal security: looking within
It may not be a transformation in how the govt views internal conflict and itself, but it's enough of a gift in this season of small mercies
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“It’s not a deficit, it’s a vacuum. It’s a vacuum of security, of development, of politics."
That wasn’t me talking about internal security in general and the Maoist rebellion in particular, or some of my more learned colleagues from civil society. That was a top, veteran anti-insurgency specialist with the government.
The official added: “We have to handle issues of human rights professionally. If human rights have been violated then the person must be prosecuted. That applies to the forces as well as Maoists."
Such frank and refreshing talk made the meeting in New Delhi I flagged in last week’s column (Maoism: getting on the same page) worthwhile. Besides discussing the Maoist rebellion, its root causes, application, and perhaps most importantly, the vacuum and corruption that led to its rise, perpetuation and spread, the day-long meeting on 18 December brought key representatives of the security apparatus and human rights specialists, analysts and academicians together.
This wasn’t a television debate where sly or vacuous anchors riding on adrenaline and self-importance downplay sensible answers and encourage the misleadingly sensational, but an exchange of views with a stated purpose to engage in crucial discourse to better understand the other.
While such understanding was expected by the hosts to lead to more empathetic play of some government perspectives in media and other fora, another purpose was stated as helping improve training in the police and paramilitary apparatus. “There are well-meaning individuals in government," explained a retired bureaucrat. (He claimed to have encouraged dialogue between the state and Maoists—and perceived Maoist sympathizers. This last was in response to those among us who pressed for a track of dialogue to be maintained with Maoists irrespective of the state of conflict and irrespective of the failure of previous peace overtures.)
He also addressed the issue of collateral damage, the tragic fallout of conflict when non-combatants are deliberately or inadvertently fused with the fighting. Salwa Judum remains among the more grotesque examples of such application by the state (the Maoists too have a laundry list of brutality, but relatively less widespread). “We stress on training," the retired bureaucrat maintained. “We tell our police and paramilitary officers: no torture, no beatings, no (staged) encounters. It’s going down the line. It’s not pervasive but I believe change is beginning to happen."
The meeting wasn’t devoid of shrillness, but ironically, it was provided by those associated with the security establishment. Among others, this included an academic from Delhi University who has made a career of whitewashing human rights wrongs (his classic assertion at the meeting: “The Maoists are responsible for Salwa Judum"). And a retired army general who evidently believed that his bring-it-on patriotism was more patriotic than anyone else’s; he metaphorically advocated the use of a hydraulic excavator when a spade would do.
The retired general advocated the immediate and lavish use of the army to tackle the Maoist rebellion. Such a view still thankfully belongs to a fringe among serving and retired army officers. Successive army chiefs and defence ministers have strenuously, and to my mind, correctly advocated the non-deployment of the army to quell Maoism. They gauged the matter of such rebellion to be a tricky mix of security, policing, development, governance and politics, an overcooked soup which the army clearly doesn’t relish—and has led to disastrous socio-political consequences whenever and wherever it has been ordered to feed on it.
I cannot of course presume to speak for others who attended the meeting, but I believe such interactions should take place at the minimum of twice a year and ideally four times. A trust dividend would inevitably accrue—quicker if positive administrative and conflict resolution results were seen on the ground.
If views generated during such meetings were conveyed to political leaders in New Delhi and in states where the Maoist rebellion exists in forms ranging from acute to imminent, it would serve a great purpose—though politicians were widely seen as part of the problem, not the solution. In addition, people not employed by, or associated with, government should increasingly be invited to discuss such matters at police and paramilitary training institutes.
“I accept that we are clumsy," a home ministry official said with admirable forthrightness. “The state is often clumsy. We have to find a way to ensure that we are less clumsy."
I wouldn’t certify this as new thinking and a transformation in how the government views internal conflict and itself, but what the heck, it’s enough of a gift in this season of small mercies.
Sudeep Chakravarti is the author of Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country and Highway 39: Journeys through a Fractured Land. This column focuses on conflict situations in South Asia that directly affect business. Respond to this column at rootcause@livemint.com
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