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Business News/ Politics / Policy/  Professor Kanti Bajpai | Revamping the Indian foreign service
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Professor Kanti Bajpai | Revamping the Indian foreign service

The scholar on IFS, preserving and improving India's academic institutions, and learning from international best practices

Kanti Bajpai says, in foreign policy and national security, the Modi government must build on the UPA’s successes and be bolder than Manmohan Singh. Premium
Kanti Bajpai says, in foreign policy and national security, the Modi government must build on the UPA’s successes and be bolder than Manmohan Singh.

Singapore: Few scholars in India know more about Indian foreign policy and national security than Professor Kanti Bajpai. Over the last three decades, Bajpai has through his writings and research contributed significantly to the growth of Indian strategic thinking, which used to be thought of as a relatively weak area of Indian academics.

Bajpai has been a world-class academic, a respected analyst, and a savvy thinker on international affairs. Since 1989, Bajpai has taught in leading universities, including M.S University of Baroda, Jawaharlal Nehru University of Delhi, Oxford University and the National University of Singapore.

Bajpai comes from an eminent family of Indian diplomats: his father, Uma Shankar Bajpai was India’s High Commissioner to Canada; an uncle, K.S. Bajpai, was Ambassador to US, China and Pakistan; and grandfather Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, was the first Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs (1947-1952) and Governor of Bombay State (1952-1954).

Steeped in the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), Bajpai is somewhat critical of how it is presently structured.

“India has only 600 frontline foreign service officers as compared to 5000 in China and 10,000 in the US," he notes with some exasperation. “We have roughly 150 missions in the world and on average only 4 IFS officers at each mission. What can we hope to accomplish with this meagre force in the 21st century?"

The IFS’s plans to expand recruitment from 10-15 officers to 30 officers per year, Bajpai feels, will not be enough to meet the needs of the country and its aspirations to project power on the global stage.

“We need to have a more creative recruitment policy and have the courage to sell it politically," he says.

He suggests overhauling the system by bringing in the best and the brightest talent from other professional fields, and getting past the mindset of “recruiting mostly examination junkies with no creativity and spark".

“We should recruit the finest quality minds from the fields of international relations, politics, sociology, and history, who are better equipped to deal with nuance and strategic thinking," he says. “Doctor and engineers are good to have in small numbers, but the Foreign Service needs to be injected with more sophisticated and nimble minds. We should recruit thoughtful journalists, academics and even business leaders in the foreign service today."

The IFS he thinks should “up its game" -- it should not only recruit differently, but also retrain and engage with some of the leading global policy institutes to absorb the latest thinking in geopolitics that will serve India’s grand strategy in the long term.

As to why he did not join the IFS, he says that bureaucracy and hierarchy do not suit him. “In the realm of ideas in academia, there is no rank, just shades of truth."

He is proud of his six-year stint at Doon School, one of India’s premier public schools, where he was appointed the eighth headmaster in 2003. He overhauled its curriculum to bring in the International Baccalaureate (IB), modernized the campus, improved discipline and academic standards, and helped set up a fundraising campaign.

“I believe in preserving and improving India’s academic institutions by learning from global best practices while retaining our roots," he says. “In India, we start with building great institutions and then we allow them to degrade and stagnate."

Prior to joining Doon, Bajpai taught international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in Delhi for nearly a decade. He cherishes this experience for many reasons.

“In JNU, the diversity of students is extraordinary," he notes. “They come from very humble backgrounds from all parts of rural and urban India. You can see their hunger and the kind of progress they make by the end of their studies. They work very hard in often horribly trying living conditions."

He also appreciates the conceptual and theoretical thinking of JNU that produces “geeks who are obsessed with political and social issues."

“JNU students are very political people and are deeply committed to social causes," he adds.

Despite its strengths, Bajpai points to areas where JNU can bring about significant improvements to compare with some of the best international affairs and policy schools globally.

After JNU, Bajpai taught briefly at Oxford University before joining the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore as a senior professor. He says it has been a fulfilling experience to play a modest role in helping build a world-class school of public policy in Asia -- one that trains the next generation of leaders and policymakers of the region.

“Teaching and doing research in Singapore has been a wonderful experience as there is tremendous support for higher education. Also, Singapore’s proximity to China, India and South East Asia makes it an ideal place to better understand and engage with a dynamic region."

Bajpai admires Singapore for its commitment to constantly learning from international best practices and improving upon them in order to achieve excellence in all aspects of governance.

He is currently working on a book on India-China relations titled China and India: Rising Peacefully Together with Professor Huang Jing of LKY School of Public Policy.

In an interview, Bajpai talks about the long-standing and complex political and economic disputes between India and China; India and Pakistan; and India and the US. He is keen to find pragmatic ways to resolve these tensions through greater cooperation.

Edited excerpts:

There seems to be tremendous untapped potential for growth of economic ties between India and China. Do you think Modi will be able to overcome the burden of history with our neighbour and chart a new course? If so, how?

Modi thinks long term, and he is capable of being decisive. His stated focus on growth, development and good governance can certainly enhance current bilateral relations between China and India.

China is already India’s largest trading partner. Of course, Indians would like a more equitable trade balance with China, which has a surplus of $40 billion in total trade with India -- when total bilateral trade amounts to $70 billion. The Chinese have recently said that they will try to rectify this to some extent but that India needs to put its own house in order if it is to export more to China.

Modi’s vision to industrialize India rapidly can be aided by China, which is willing to invest up to $300 billion to upgrade Indian infrastructure. The Chinese are keen to invest in the upgrading and modernization of India’s current railway, highway and even river linkage projects, in building various power-generation projects, in investing in labour-intensive industries, even participating in the construction of the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bengaluru industrial corridors, currently dominated by Japanese companies.

China and India could also build up mutually complementary production chains in industries like textiles, automobiles, pharmaceuticals and electronics. This could significantly help improve India’s economic performance in the coming years. Both countries should see each other’s development as an opportunity.

Modi in his election campaign this year promised to take a harder line on protecting India’s borders with China than his predecessor and warned China to drop its “territorial mindset". While this could be considered election rhetoric, what do you think he will be willing to concede in order to resolve the long-standing border dispute?

Modi is trying to play a fine balancing act with China, which requires him to win Chinese investment for infrastructure and other projects and at the same time strengthen border security.

India accuses China of occupying 38,000 sq. kms of territory in Jammu and Kashmir, while Beijing lays claim to 90,000 sq. kms of land in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Modi has to dilute the significance of these long-standing historical bilateral border disputes by expanding the common ground between the two countries. He has to find pragmatic solutions to move forward.

What are some of these pragmatic solutions to solve the border issue with China in your view?

Any solution must be built on the 2005 agreement on the broad guidelines and principles for a final border settlement. Nobody in India or China has objected to the agreement, so it has a degree of legitimacy. Modi can use his sweeping political mandate to leverage the agreement to find a settlement. The beauty of the 2005 agreement is that virtually any sensible deal on the border will be consistent with the broad guidelines and principles in the 2005 accord and will therefore have legitimacy.

At this stage, the thorniest problem is the status of Arunachal Pradesh which China refers to as South Tibet. The Tawang Monastery, which has great symbolic significance because it is the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, is in Arunachal.

The history of Tawang is that when the border known as the McMahon Line was drawn up in 1914, Tibet gave up several hundred square miles of its territory, including the whole of the Tawang region and the monastery, to the British.

The McMahon Line is regarded today by India as the legal national border. It is disputed by China which has tried to stake its claim over Tawang and the rest of Arunachal. India has rebutted these claims by the Chinese and in turn claims it as an integral part of India.

As recently as 2003, the Dalai Lama said that Tawang was part of Tibet, but he reversed his position in 2008, acknowledging the legitimacy of the McMahon Line and the Indian claim.

So, what resolution do you envision then for Tawang and the McMahon line?

One could envision some kind of internationalization of Tawang, where rights and access are shared by both countries. The other possibility is to divide Tawang district into a Chinese and Indian segment.

As for the McMahon Line, China will never accept it as the legal border. It will probably accept an adjustment of the border whereby India gets the substance of Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian government is aware of this, but needs to explain to the public that the substance of Arunachal is more important than a highly formal legal settlement that endorses India’s current position which is virtually impossible to achieve.

What should India focus on if it gives up demanding that China accept the legitimacy of the McMahon Line?

The most realistic option is a package deal in which China gets most of what it wants in Aksai Chin in the western sector and India gets most of what it wants in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. The issue of Tawang is the most difficult to resolve. In total, there appear to be 14 points of difference on the long border from Aksai Chin to Arunachal Pradesh. Some have suggested that these 14 be bracketed and that the two sides agree to a settlement on the rest of the border. While this sounds attractive, it may not be terribly practical since the 14 are presumably of strategic significance.

The other challenging neighbour India has is Pakistan. What can Modi do to pluck the low-hanging fruit with Pakistan for greater peace and stability to take hold?

First, India and Pakistan should collaborate together in making Afghanistan a more stable country given the common shared interest of reducing extremism originating out of an unstable Afghanistan. After the American retreat, India and Pakistan should jointly work towards finding a regional-backed solution with China, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and perhaps Turkey.

This may be aided by the fact that the Chinese have become more ambitious in the region as the US becomes more preoccupied with Iraq, the Ukraine, and East Asia. Beijing may be willing to take more regional responsibility going forward.

Second, Modi should start the process of resolving the long-standing dispute over Siachen. In fact, there is a 1993 agreement which can form the basis for a settlement on Siachen so that the forces on both sides can be retrenched from the treacherous heights and return to a more climatically congenial place.

Third, Modi should find a way to ink the Sir Creek agreement. Sir Creek, which is a 96-km strip of water between India and Pakistan, is in the Rann of Kutch marshlands. The Creek, which opens up into the Arabian Sea, divides the Kutch region of the Indian state of Gujarat with the Sindh province of Pakistan. The dispute is over the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. India supports its stance by citing the Thalweg Doctrine in International Law. The law states that river boundaries between two states may be divided by the mid-channel line. Here again, Modi could resurrect the 1993 agreement that the two sides had more or less concluded.

Fourth, Modi should help Sharif find the political will to grant India MFN (most favoured nation) status. Of course, the Pakistani leader has to persuade the Pakistani military and intelligence and be courageous in this regard, but if New Delhi can agree on Siachen and Sir Creek, it will be easier for Sharif to grant MFN. In addition, India has to control Indian business groups that often lobby against trade agreements. If India has to make some concessions on trade, it should do so in the strategic interest.

So you are suggesting some kind of a package deal where both India and Pakistan concede some ground to the other for Sharif to build political consensus domestically?

Yes, if India can move forward on the Siachen and Sir Creek disputes -- which are just waiting to be resolved -- Sharif can sell MFN domestically as part of a package deal.

The new prime minister must dust off the near-agreements of 1993 and overrule the Indian Army on Siachen and come to a reasonable agreement on Sir Creek. With that done, more ambitious things might be attempted, particularly on Kashmir.

The security problem emanating from Pakistan still remains very serious. If there is a repeat attack such as the one in 2008, will it not be very hard for Modi to move forward with these solutions above?

BJP-led governments have been more aggressive historically than the Congress, so there is a good chance that Modi will respond more forcefully to any major provocation emanating from Pakistan; but he too, like (former prime ministers Atal Bihari) Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, has to worry about a confrontation with a nuclear-armed neighbour. The Indian government recognizes that the Pakistani establishment is not necessarily involved in organizing terrorist attacks against India, so New Delhi’s responses to an attack have to take this and the possibility of military escalation into consideration.

The Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments both recognized that one has to engage one’s adversary. After all, you negotiate peace with your enemies and rivals, not your friends and allies.

The notion that we cannot engage Pakistan until it stops flirting with terrorism is simply unworkable – even the Israelis have talked to their enemies. To New Delhi’s credit, it has always engaged Pakistan, almost without interruption, going back to the comprehensive dialogue – the six-plus-two dialogue – instituted by the Narasimha Rao government in 1991. India has to continue to open up working space for Pakistani leaders who need to be able to tell their constituencies that they were able to wring some concessions from India. In return, Pakistan has to give some very concrete concessions to India.

India-US relations have been lukewarm under the Obama administration. What is the reason for this, and how can Modi revive a strong relationship with this key ally?

The US-India relationship has deteriorated since 2008 as both sides began to edge away from the nuclear agreement. Also, conventional arms transfers from the US have never quite materialized, at least not in the frontline areas that India wanted. Both countries are to blame for this. Things have not been helped by the Khobragade dispute and the US treatment of our diplomats. Also, there have been a whole series of economic disputes with the US.

Strategically, India made a calculation in and around 2008 that America is a declining superpower and China an emerging one. China is also our largest trading partner, is in our backyard, and can use many levers to interfere with our domestic politics if Beijing is not managed properly. So, a quasi-alliance with the US did not seem wise. India appears now to have moved back to a more non-aligned position, which is probably a sensible thing.

US leaders including Obama, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have urged India to be more involved with the Asia Pacific. But there has been a deafening silence from New Delhi on this issue. This has naturally not gone down terribly well in Washington.

Modi can first of all work on building better economic ties with the US. With the possible opening up of the defence sector to FDI (foreign direct investment), military ties could strengthen as well. There is also a strong Indian American community that loves Modi and could work to improve the relationship.

So the stars are aligned for India and Modi to forge a better relationship with the US.

First though, he has to put India’s house in order and put the nation back on track to create an investor-friendly environment for the Americans as well as for the Chinese and, indeed, for anyone who is willing to bet on India.

Will the BJP led government under Modi be more ambitious and successful than the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in resolving foreign policy issues?

One of the successes of the UPA was foreign policy and external as well as internal security. Relations with Pakistan, China, and the US were more stable than during the Vajpayee government, and there were successes – fewer terrorist attacks in Kashmir, the 2005 agreement on a possible border settlement with China, and the nuclear deal with the US. Internally, the Naxalites have been contained as have various separatists groups. On the other hand, there have been no fundamental breakthroughs with Pakistan or China, and a promising start with the US has faltered to the point that Washington, having denied Modi a visa all these years, is secretly pleased to see him take charge in Delhi. As for Maoism, it is in retreat but could resurge.

In sum, in foreign policy and national security the Modi government must build on UPA successes and be bolder than Manmohan Singh.

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Published: 04 Jul 2014, 12:23 AM IST
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