How dangerous would Asian security be without America?

AFTER RUSSIA invaded Ukraine in 2022 Kishida Fumio, then Japan’s prime minister, repeated a warning: “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow.” He was implying that China might use force to take control of Taiwan. But as Donald Trump turns the screws on Ukraine, the phrase has taken on a new meaning. What if the risk is America abandoning its allies and friends in Asia, too?

Europeans are quickly facing up to all the uncertainties. In Asia, the risk of American retreat seems more remote. If America views China as a threat, it cannot afford to alienate Asian partners. America will “not abandon” the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan’s defence minister said earlier this month. Security assistance to Taiwan and the Philippines was exempted from America’s recent foreign-aid freeze. “The situation here is different from Europe—China poses a major strategic challenge to America,” says Sasae Kenichiro, a former Japanese ambassador to America.

Alliance structures would be hard for Mr Trump to dismantle at a whim, and without congressional approval. America has dozens of bases on the territory of its Asian friends, and some 90,000 troops stationed at them. Despite Mr Trump’s unconventional diplomacy in Europe, military relationships in Asia have continued to function normally. Just two days after Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, was berated in the Oval Office, an American aircraft-carrier made a scheduled call at a port in South Korea.

Yet even in Asia, a reckoning with the new Trumpian America is beginning to take place. The showdown between Mr Trump and Mr Zelensky “shows that South Korea’s national interests and security could be compromised at any time”, declared Ahn Cheol-soo, a lawmaker from South Korea’s conservative ruling party. Some fear that Mr Trump’s eagerness to strike a deal with Vladimir Putin may herald a willingness to do the same with Xi Jinping or Kim Jong Un.

At the very least, Asian allies will not be spared Mr Trump’s transactionalism. This month he railed against South Korea’s purported tariff barriers and complained that America’s alliance with Japan is unfair. “Not only European countries but Japan, too, is being forced to build international relations on the premise that it cannot rely on the United States,” writes Fujiwara Kiichi of the University of Tokyo.

What can Asian allies do? One response is to try to stay in Mr Trump’s good graces. Flattery and promises of new investments in America seem to help. Mr Trump wants Japan and South Korea to back a big new pipeline for liquefied natural gas from Alaska. Asian allies have some leverage of their own, as key players in industries from shipbuilding to semiconductors. They can also begin to diversify risks. Choi Yoon-jung of the Sejong Institute, a South Korean think-tank, calls for adopting an “America +1 strategy”.

But the balance of power is harsher for American allies in Asia than in Europe. “Even if we do more for ourselves, that doesn’t mean we’ll be ok on our own,” says Hikotani Takako of Gakushuin University in Tokyo. Excluding America, the defence spending of the remaining NATO allies is still three times that of Russia, while the cumulative defence spending of America’s treaty allies in Asia (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) is less than half of China’s. In order for the combined sum to equal China’s defence spending, those allies would all have to spend more than 3.5% of GDP on defence (only South Korea spends more than 2%).

Existing plans to build up conventional armed forces can be speeded up. Japan, for example, aims to raise defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027; Australia is building its largest naval fleet since the second world war. Yet such plans are largely designed to complement American power, not to replace it. Japan is acquiring long-range missiles, but they will require American intelligence for targeting; Australia is counting on America to help build nuclear submarines under the AUKUS pact.

Another answer is more co-operation among Asian allies themselves, and with European countries. France recently sent an aircraft-carrier strike group to the Pacific Ocean for the first time in more than 50 years. South Korea’s foreign minister has been touring Europe this month. Ishii Masafumi, a former Japanese ambassador, argues that responding to “America’s wolf warrior diplomacy” requires imagining novel diplomatic configurations: what about an “Asian Quad” comprising Japan, India, Australia and Indonesia?

But in Asia the only military alliances are bilateral ones with America. This “hub and spokes” system amounts to little more than a pile of sticks without a hub. European navies’ port calls are encouraging, but carry no commitment. NATO has two additional nuclear powers in France and Britain; Asian allies rely solely on America’s nuclear umbrella. If America withdraws, “Asia will be dominated by Chinese influence,” says Kanehara Nobukatsu, a former Japanese official.

In such a situation, some will shift to accommodating China. Others may look to an independent nuclear arsenal as the ultimate security solution. In South Korea such conversations have been bubbling for years, and have accelerated in recent weeks. Even lawmakers in the left-leaning Democratic Party, which tends to be opposed to nuclear armament, have called for starting discussions on nuclear-policy options. Voices across the political spectrum now advocate for South Korea at least seeking the ability to reprocess spent fuel from its civil nuclear industry, which would give it access to fissile material, reducing the time it would potentially take to build a bomb. (Japan already possesses this “latent” nuclear capability.)

In Japan debates are more muted. The legacy of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still looms large. But the first weeks of Trump 2.0 have policymakers thinking and talking more about the problem. “Nuclear weapons are something that Japan should discuss—there should be some other way beyond extended deference,” says a source close to the Japanese government. Public opinion may change if South Korea chooses to go nuclear. Others in the region may try to follow.