It’s easy to be a China hawk; the script essentially writes itself. It’s even easier to be a China dove, clinging to the ghosts of a globalization that no longer exists. But it’s much harder to be a realist—to look at America’s biggest strategic competitor and seek a stable middle ground.
To find that ground, I recently sat down with Timothy Stratford, whose career serves as a cross-section of the U.S.-China story itself. Stratford, who is fluent in Mandarin and Cantonese, has spent decades navigating the relationship from almost every conceivable angle: as a diplomat and assistant U.S. trade representative, general counsel for General Motors’ China operations, and now, a senior counsel at Covington.
There is a certain humility in his approach that likely stems from his time as a missionary in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It taught him early on that deeply held convictions—whether theological or ideological—don’t yield easily to simple logic or Western worldviews.
This groundedness is what allows him to see past the “Chimerica” era of symbiotic embrace that defined the early 2000s. He knows that the current friction between Washington and Beijing isn’t just a policy disagreement, but a collision of two fundamentally different systems. And he’s trying to map out a managed coexistence between the two world powers.
Stratford’s assessment of where U.S.-China relations stand today is sobering. Following the summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping in South Korea late last year, relations have entered what he describes as a “strategic stalemate.” While a fragile one-year truce managed to roll back certain tariffs, the fundamental friction remains as hot as ever. Stratford uses a haunting metaphor for this moment, comparing the current interaction between the two nations to “traveling together through a long, dark tunnel.”
“While we are necessarily moving forward together because of our mutual dependence, each side distrusts the other side’s long-term intentions,” he told me. “The real question is, ‘what actions will one or the other side take after it successfully reduces the leverage exercised by the other side and is free to exit the tunnel and follow its own independent path?’”
In practice, that looks like a race toward a separation. Washington is striving to break its reliance on Chinese critical minerals—the lifeblood of everything from jet fighters to electric-vehicle batteries—while Beijing pours state capital into achieving total self-sufficiency in high-tech. Each side is effectively building a survival kit for a future where they don’t need the other as much.
Stratford recognizes that China’s economic model—a state-led industrial strategy—is simply not going away. He points out that the “Made in China 2025” playbook, Xi’s signature initiative, was largely successful, allowing China to achieve dominance in critical sectors like EVs and shipbuilding.
As Beijing implements a new five-year plan through 2030, it is doubling down on a drive to build an industrial powerhouse that Stratford says is specifically designed to rely less on foreign inputs while simultaneously creating “chokepoints” over global supply chains.
For multinational corporations, this creates a phenomenon Stratford calls the “frown curve” hypothesis. Traditionally, global companies chased the “smile curve,” where profits concentrate in R&D and design at the start and branding and distribution at the end. But in the modern Chinese market, Stratford notes, foreign firms often experience a “frown”: an initial burst of success followed by a sharp decline as local players, supported by massive state subsidies, catch up and eventually push the outsiders out of the market.
If existing global trading rules are insufficient for a challenge of this magnitude, everyone from policymakers to corporate executives has to ask what the middle ground actually looks like.
Stratford argues for the need to look through three practical lenses. First, the U.S. can’t keep a lopsided trade door open if its industries and workers are the ones being hurt. Second, American companies have to accept that the purchase or sale of certain high-tech tools presents potential national security risks. And finally, the U.S. must ensure that it isn’t relying too heavily on Chinese supply chains for critical items.
The goal of a modern “America First” trade policy, in Stratford’s view, isn’t to stop all trade, but to establish a shared space for “balanced, nonsensitive trade” where U.S. and China interests actually overlap. “As the two countries work together to identify and preserve that shared space,” he said, “a more sustainable basis for bilateral economic relations can be established.”
This is certainly a far cry from the optimistic globalism of 30 years ago, but it may be the only way forward that avoids a complete, chaotic decoupling.
As Stratford puts it, the two nations are undeniably still in the tunnel. But by identifying those overlapping circles of interest, they might just find a way to exit on the other side without a collision.
China in a Few Headlines
Leaders of the AI firm acquired by Meta have been barred from leaving China.China’s MiniMax wants AI to be your new work “bestie.”China is hitting back at the U.S. by launching new trade probes just ahead of the Trump-Xi summit. Trump’s ambivalence on Taiwan has opened a historic opportunity for China.
A Closer Look
The Chinese share of American imports drops to the lowest level since 2001, but overall U.S. goods trade deficit rises.
Reader Responses
Last week, we asked our readers whether the U.S. can pivot from a military deterrent against China over Taiwan to a more integrated strategy. Some readers shared their thoughts:
“Yes they can and should. We need to lead our allies in the region to provide an integrated comprehensive defense posture. A grand discussion between the allies regarding ‘strategic ambiguity’ would be a good thing.” — Bill Lechner, Texas“Our current leadership clearly does not have the intellectual bandwidth to develop even the concept of a broad, nuanced, reality-based containment strategy toward China. More importantly, the political leadership of America reflects a permanent disarray as its society fractures into tribal and cultural division.” — Malcolm Pearson, Tennessee“Not under this president. Even if he could see the urgency of the situation, he is incapable of the kind of sustained, strategic coordination required. Even if he understood the importance of alliances in this endeavor, he has so insulted, abused and alienated our allies that he would have trouble galvanizing the cooperation he would need.” — Tracey G. Riese, New York“China will not back down and compromise on a cultural imperative; the U.S. needs to be aware of this and work diplomatically to enable Taiwan’s coexistence without imagining that China is a rogue military power bent on conquest.” — Nicholas Mitsakos, California“I do not believe that the American government is capable of mounting an integrated strategy in connection with Taiwan. Our military strength and economic leverage are strained and have limits. Our technological leadership is being challenged. Our diplomatic influence is weakening. Long-range planning, cohesion, execution, and perseverance are not hallmarks of American governance.” — Andrew Singer, Massachusetts“A more integrated strategy would require more balance and prioritizing the economic front with Southeast Asia, Japan and South Korea. The U.S., Japan, Philippines triangle is critical. Tariffs have been a major setback. The American brand of ‘dynamic stability’ has been tarnished.” — Carl T. Delfeld, Virginia
(Responses have been condensed and edited.)
About Us
WSJ China is a weekly newsletter with exclusive insights on the contest between the U.S. and China, brought to you by WSJ Chief China Correspondent Lingling Wei, with help from Zhao Yueling. Reach Lingling at lingling.wei@wsj.com or at @Lingling_Wei on X (if you’re reading this in your inbox, you can just hit reply). Sign up to get an alert every time she publishes an article. Got a tip for us? Here’s how to submit.