While a US-Iran deal continues to elude the world, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed one of their own this week—one that raises the stakes, particularly for India.
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, stipulates that an armed attack on any one of the three would be regarded as an attack on all, according to a joint statement.
The statement, however, was short on specifics, including the commitments each country has made and the extent to which the agreement would bind them to any particular military action in defence of the others.
For all intents and purposes, the pact is aimed at instilling confidence among West Asian countries amid the instability triggered by the US-Iran war. While Iran has directly targeted Saudi Arabia, its proxy, the Houthis, have targeted Saudi interests. The Houthis have threatened to disrupt Saudi oil exports through the Red Sea, but Riyadh’s bigger concern is the potential targeting of critical infrastructure, particularly desalination plants that supply much of the country's drinking water.
The coming together of three key Sunni Muslim states, all US allies, clearly reflects the erosion of the US’s credibility as a reliable partner under President Donald Trump.
It also weakens Israel’s position, which had seemingly emerged as the region’s hegemon over the past two years. Israel’s stated aim was to weaken Iran. Yet Iran now appears stronger, having withstood the combined onslaught of the US and Israel.
The trilateral pact may serve as a shield against Iran, but how far will Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—neither of which has diplomatic relations with Israel—be willing to coordinate with Jerusalem?
But the development is particularly concerning for New Delhi.
In 2025, Israel’s attack on Doha, targeting Hamas negotiators, brought Saudi Arabia and Pakistan closer, culminating in an agreement that treats an attack on either country as an attack on both, creating a new diplomatic stressor for India.
Now, Türkiye’s addition to the mix brings a whole new dimension to the partnership. Pakistan brings the nuclear umbrella and manpower, Saudi Arabia the financial muscle, and Türkiye the military-industrial capacity, giving the alliance the capabilities needed to make it a credible deterrent rather than a hollow threat.
While Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are not expected to deploy troops to support Pakistan in the event of a military conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad, the formal agreement means Riyadh’s and Ankara’s support for Islamabad is likely to be more robust, overt and easier to justify. Their roles during Operation Sindoor are worth recalling.
At the least, the alliance risks undermining India’s, and particularly Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s, efforts to recast New Delhi’s ties with West Asia since 2014. New Delhi is increasingly seen as aligned with the US-Israel-UAE axis in the region, while strained ties between the UAE and Saudi Arabia further complicate the landscape for the country.
Iran and Oman strike a deal of their own
Meanwhile, the world saw another important deal take shape during the week—one between Iran and Oman to facilitate the movement of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Initial reports suggested that the arrangement would give Tehran oversight of ships entering the Persian Gulf. However, there is no proposal to impose levies or service fees for safe passage, a relief for the international community. Under the draft agreement, inbound ships would use a designated channel closer to the Iranian coast, while outbound vessels would use a similar channel near Oman.
The draft has been shared with the US, countries in the region and Iran’s top leadership, all of whom must sign off on it.
But this is, of course, an agreement between Iran and Oman. There is still no clarity on the standoff between the US and Iran, which will ultimately determine whether the Strait remains open to energy traffic.
According to senior Iranian officials, the reopening of the waterway is contingent on unspecified conditions that Washington must meet.
The agreement could potentially pave the way for US-Iran negotiations, which, in turn, could lead to an easing of economic sanctions on Iran. On the other hand, it could cement Iran’s primacy—or at least its sway—over a waterway that, until the start of the war, had remained an open passage for the movement of energy and other imports and exports.
Trump’s interest in Brazil’s elections
Trump is busy inserting himself into Brazil’s presidential election campaign. Elections are due in October, and he is seen as intervening on behalf of the right-leaning Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of jailed former president Jair Bolsonaro.
This is unsettling for sitting president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is left-leaning. Trump sees Lula as challenging US influence in its own backyard—the Western Hemisphere. Brazil’s role in BRICS, in particular, appears to be a source of friction for Trump.
The kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the installation of Delcy Rodriguez in his place, along with the $20 billion financial lifeline extended to Argentina’s President Javier Milei through a currency swap to bolster his political prospects ahead of the polls, are already examples of Trump seeking to extend US influence in South America. Then there is the imminent threat of regime change in Cuba.
No wonder Lula is wary and has labelled Trump’s interest in the October polls “improper”. The Brazilian government did not approve Trump’s nominee for US ambassador to Brasilia and denied entry to several US diplomats it suspected of interfering in the election. In response, Washington revoked the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to the US.
Lula, 80, is seeking re-election, which would give him a record fourth term in office. Flavio Bolsonaro, 45, is seeking to win and cement his credentials as his father’s political heir. Bolsonaro, who is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence for plotting to overturn the results of the 2022 election, has drawn comparisons with the 6 January 2021 attack on the US Capitol by Trump supporters who falsely believed the election had been stolen from Trump and handed to Democrat Joe Biden.
For now, opinion polls suggest a close race, with Lula holding a slender lead over Bolsonaro.
Elizabeth Roche is an associate professor of practice at O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana.
For more of her columns, read The International Angle.