This is the second part of a two-part series on how India should position itself in the emerging new world order of multiple regional conflicts, rivalries and alliances surrounding the central rivalry between the US and China.
The first part (Mint, 31 August) dealt with the most complex of these emerging regional structures, the scenario in West Asia. This part discusses similar structures which may—or may not—be emerging in other parts of the world and India’s position in the emerging geopolitical architecture of the 21st century.
Russian support for Iran, along with that of China, plus Zelensky’s recent visit to West Asia and EU initiatives to protect trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz link the emerging structure of conflict and alliances in West Asia with the post-Cold War conflict and alliances in Europe.
The Ukraine War is the latest stage in a conflict that goes back to Nato’s eastward expansion despite assurances given to Moscow during the collapse of the Soviet Union that this would not happen.
Russia’s fear of the eastward extension of Nato is therefore understandable, but so are European fears of Russian expansionism. This war of attrition between Nato-backed Ukraine and Russia may eventually grind to a halt with accommodation on both sides due to sheer exhaustion.
Meanwhile, notwithstanding internal disagreements, a tectonic shift is underway in European security arrangements, with EU countries and the UK aiming to step up their defence budgets to 5% of GDP. Europe’s defence industrial capability is literally being multiplied on a war footing.
Henceforth, European powers will likely be far more independent and assertive within Nato, as was already evident at the recent Ankara summit, and will seek political or economic accommodation with other countries to serve their interests. The US will remain a major partner, but its influence will be more muted, like in West Asia.
Central Asia is the third important region with major developments. Located at the heart of the Eurasian landmass, surrounded by China, Russia, Central Europe, West Asia and South Asia, there is no other region with such strategic locational significance.
The region’s five countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—and possibly Azerbaijan in the near future are establishing a Central Asian Community. Resolving their disputes through friendship treaties, they seem committed to leveraging their strategic location.
Agreements with countries and regions around them (and those beyond like the US) may shape their developmental trajectories.
Thus, there is an emerging pattern of countries in regional geographies coming together, despite their differences, to prioritize their collective interests over those of an external or aspiring hegemon.
South America contrasts with this pattern. There, the Monroe Doctrine of US domination is in active evidence. Large countries like Argentina, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Columbia and also small countries like Equador, Honduras and Panama have right-wing governments loyal to the US. Venezuela has been neutralized. The only outliers are Brazil and Mexico, which must be under intense pressure to fall in line.
Africa is a continent where no clear picture is evident. There is still too much internal civil strife within countries and tension between countries, which makes it difficult to discern any clear direction of how its geopolitical scenario will evolve.
A grouping that cuts across all these geographic regions is Brics. Despite its somewhat rudderless formation 20 years ago, this group of developing countries has emerged as a significant force is global geopolitics. Its 11 members and 10 partner countries together account for about half the world population, 40% of global GDP and more than a quarter of total cross-border trade.
In that sense, it is much more muscular than the G-7. All the five regions described above are represented in the group, though barring founder member Brazil, it has no other member yet from South America; Bolivia and Cuba are partners.
Despite rivalries among some of them (such as between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE), the group is engaging with practical initiatives across a wide range of issues from climate change and terrorism to global trade and finance.
Following the forthcoming New Delhi summit, when China will take over as Brics chair from India, it will certainly try to leverage the group as an instrument against the US in its competition with the latter.
How should India position itself in this emerging plurilateral geopolitical architecture of regional groups, each pursuing its own interest through varying alliances and cooperative arrangements with others within and outside each group?
As Canada’s premier Mark Carney said in his landmark Davos speech earlier this year, middle powers must cooperate with one another to ensure they have a seat at the table and do not become a part of the menu.
A variable geometry of different groups cooperating on various issues could achieve that. This must also be India’s way forward. Multi-alignment is indeed the strategy that India seems to be pursuing. As commerce minister Piyush Goyal recently remarked, India now has nine free trade agreements and another 8-9 on the table. Eventually, India’s trade-deal partners could cover up to 75% of global trade.
Some balancing is desirable. Though India has recently tilted closer to the US-Israel alliance for economic, intelligence and defence ties, its long historical relationship with Iran and Palestine need not be compromised.
Similarly, while sustaining its long relationship with Russia as a reliable friend, India also needs to forge deeper economic and political cooperation with the UK and EU countries. Pakistan has vastly enhanced its stature through its recent role in West Asia and especially the Makkah Agreement, but that should not set back India’s relations with Saudi Arabia (or other countries like Egypt and the UAE).
Hopefully, India will pursue its multi-alignment strategy energetically. But its leverage in these alignments will depend in large measure on how it manages relationships in its own neighbourhood: that is, with Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and, eventually, even Pakistan.
This is the concluding part of this series.
The author is chairman, Centre for Development Studies.