
What it means to have a fertility rate of 2
Summary
The drop in India’s fertility rate below ‘replacement level’ has been both welcome and along expected lines but it will be many years before the country’s population will actually peakThe National Family Health Survey-5 shows that fertility in India is declining, with the total fertility rate (TFR) having reached 2, a notch below the 2.1 replacement level of fertility. This has spurred a debate on the pace of population growth in India and its consequences. Some are rejoicing this much-desired milestone, while others, though welcoming the fertility decline, are bemoaning its consequences for our population growth and demographic dividend.
We focus on two key themes, population- growth scenarios and demographic diversity, to give the discussion better clarity.
First, India has entered a low-fertility era, but we would like to point out that there is nothing out of the blue here. The decline in TFR is as per trends in recent years. Population projections undertaken in 2020 by the National Commission on Population (NCP) had projected India’s TFR at 2.1 in 2019 and at 1.94 by 2021-2025.
Second, based on this declining trend in TFR and other population parameters, population projections by the NCP show that India’s population will continue to increase from 2011 to 2036, to 1,522 million.
Another population-projection exercise by the Indian unit of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in 2017, detailed in Demographic Dividend in India, shows a similar trend. As per this study, despite a declining TFR, India’s “population momentum" will keep our overall headcount growing for some more years before it stabilizes and then declines. Our population is expected to peak at 1,657 million around 2060, after which it is projected to decline, albeit slowly. Hence, all talk of an immediate ‘population collapse’ or ‘depopulation’ seems premature.
Third, we need to acknowledge the demographic diversity in India and its consequences for policy planning. Demographically speaking, India is akin to three continents: There are some states, mostly southern and border states, that have a TFR similar to developed countries in Europe; there are states in the north-central region of India where fertility is like that of under-developed countries; and then there are the rest of the states whose demographic transition lies in-between these two sets. As per the NCP population projections, more than half—i.e., 170 million of the total 311 million population growth in India from 2011 to 2036—will occur in the five states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. On the other hand, the contribution of our five southern states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana and Tamil Nadu, will be only 29 million, or 9% of the total population growth.
Fourth, let us look at demographic-dividend prospects. As per the NCP’s population projections, the share of workers in the age-group 15-59 years in the total population increase will be 81.4% between 2011 and 2036. Similarly, as per UNFPA India’s population projections, India entered its demographic-dividend opportunity window around 2005-06, and will remain there till 2055-56. The lowest point in the country’s dependency ratio is expected between 2021 and 2041. The share of working-age people in the overall population increase will be about 80% during 2001-2031, and the proportion of working-age people in the overall population will be 65% in 2031 and 58% in 2061.
We miss out on important insights if we only look at our demographic dividend at the country level. Given our demographic diversity, differing age compositions will mean different time periods for the onset and end of this dividend in Indian states. While the working-age ratio will increase in our northern states, it will start declining in the southern states. As advanced demographic-stage states (like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, etc) exhaust their opportunity, late demographic-stage states (such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) will see their demographic-dividend window open.
Fifth, and finally, our demographic diversity means increased migration. The mass exodus of migrants seen during the lockdown in 2020 stood testimony to the youth having sought employment opportunities in far-off states and cities.
While there are various facets of our demographic status that need concerted attention, let us take the issue of skill development. This has begun being seen as critical for the employment of Indian youth in large enough numbers, especially in northern states. However, the lack of popularity among our youth of the courses on offer can be attributed to their inability to get gainful employment, an outcome of labour demand and supply mismatches in particular geographies within states. While some states have started skill-development universities, which is welcome, these should be supplemented with skill-training institutes in each district and some sub-district towns as well, especially those with high out-migration. What the country critically needs is a well-coordinated approach to employment generation that can join all the dots.
India’s demographic diversity results in varied development scenarios in different states. To address the challenge of harnessing our demographic dividend, the need of the hour is to take into account the size of the youth population that’s seeking employment and the quantum of migration, learn from past experiences in skill development, and then focus efforts on the youth in need of various skills in large numbers.
Devender Singh & Venkatesh Srinivasan are former United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) India staff and worked on population and development issues.