Energy security, at its core, is a logistics problem. It is not enough to have the right suppliers; you need ships, terminals, pipelines and diplomatic channels to move their products through any open route.
The Strait of Hormuz disruption was the most severe test faced in the modern era. Since late February, the Strait—through which 120 ships passed daily before the Gulf conflict broke out—fell to fewer than 10 daily transits.
For India, which imports around 90% of its crude oil and draws the bulk of its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Gulf countries, the exposure was direct, severe and immediate.
What followed tested whether India’s logistics architecture strengthened over a decade would hold. India-bound ships eventually did cross the Strait. It held.
The foundation for that outcome was structural, not reactive. Over the preceding decade, India had systematically dismantled its dependence on any single supply corridor. LPG import terminals doubled from 11 to 22, distributing supply risk across the coastline. The crude supplier base widened from 27 countries to 41, spanning the Americas, West Africa, Russia and the Atlantic Basin alongside the Gulf.
Domestic refinery capacity was configured for a wide variety of crude—so that when familiar Gulf barrels stopped arriving, the system could adapt without shutting down.
The first and most consequential victory was diplomatic. India secured vessel transit exemptions early—a status shared with only five nations globally—through Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s direct engagement.
Operation Urja Suraksha, providing naval cover in the Gulf of Oman, sent an unambiguous signal to shipping insurers that India-flagged vessels had protected passage.
In a crisis when most nations scrambled for spot cargo and emergency bilateral agreements, India had already negotiated its way to the front. Between March and late June, 30 India-bound ships crossed the Strait and had transited the war zone by mid-June.
The second victory was strategic autonomy in sourcing. While Asian economies that had concentrated their LNG and LPG supply in Gulf producers faced immediate shortfalls and resorted to spot procurement at prices 44% above pre-war levels, India pivoted without panic.
Crude was re-routed through alternative Gulf ports; alternative sourcing was activated simultaneously from Algeria, the US, Norway, Canada and Russia. Non-Hormuz crude sourcing rose from roughly 55% to 70% within weeks.
India buys hydrocarbons from geopolitically opposed blocs simultaneously—from Washington’s allies and from Moscow, from Gulf monarchies and from Atlantic democracies—without political constraints. What some may see as diplomatic ambiguity is actually energy security—and is worth every relationship that went into building it.
The third victory was domestic production. When LPG imports slumped, India chose to step up its domestic production. The LPG Control Order of 8 March directed every refinery to maximize output, and within a week, Indian output had risen from 35,000 to 54,000 tonnes a day, with plants re-configured in innovative ways to do so. A combined inventory buffer of about two months across crude oil, LPG and LNG gave planners time to operationalize alternative sourcing.
The fourth victory was on consumer sensitivity. Unlike other countries, the only restrictions applied were on commercial LPG, diesel and aviation fuel exports—designed to protect households. By any international comparison, Indian consumers experienced only a mild disruption, with the lowest price hikes among major energy importers. This outcome came at a fiscal cost. However, an unwavering political commitment put households first.
India’s task now is to extend its structural advantage. The country currently charters nearly all its oil and gas import vessels, leaving freight costs exposed at vulnerable times. An SCI–IOCL–BPCL–ONGC joint venture for 62 owned vessels addresses this issue directly. An Oman-Gujarat deepwater pipeline can route 10–15% of India’s gas demand through a chokepoint-free corridor.
In all, the Hormuz crisis validated a decade of infrastructure investment and set out an outline of national tasks for the next decade: vessel ownership, pipeline connectivity, strategic reserves of crude oil, LPG and gas, and a formal ceiling on any single supply region’s share of imports. Resilience is never accidental. Neither is the work required to strengthen it.
The author is former chairperson and managing director, Engineers India Ltd.