Europe’s China gambit will fall short of its stated goals4 min read . Updated: 12 Jan 2021, 10:00 PM IST
Judge the deal not by how it impacts China but whether it lets Europe stay true to its own values
Just as 2020 was ending, the EU and China announced the completion of a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between the two. This “will be the most ambitious agreement that China has ever concluded with a third country," boasted the European Commission.
The CAI gives European firms enhanced access to the Chinese market, removes (or relaxes) Chinese government requirements on joint ventures and technology transfer in some sectors, and promises equal treatment with state enterprises and greater regulatory transparency. Moreover, the Chinese government has undertaken some obligations on environmental sustainability and labour rights, notably by agreeing to make “continued and sustained efforts" to ratify the Forced Labour Convention.
On paper, this is a win not only for European industry, but also for human rights. But the reception the CAI has received has not been uniformly positive. The US reaction ranged from disappointment to outright hostility. For hardliners, Europe’s decision looked like caving in to Chinese economic might and handing Beijing a diplomatic win. But many moderates, including President-elect Joe Biden’s designated national security adviser, were dismayed as well. The incoming Biden administration would have preferred a unified front against China, by striking an economic deal with Europe first. For others, it was the EU’s apparent naivete on China’s human rights promises that rankled.
The Europe-China agreement underscores a fundamental question of the post-pandemic world order: How should strategic and economic relations between major powers with different institutional and political arrangements be managed? Can democracies remain true to their values while engaging in trade and investment with China?
To answer that, we must recognize two facts. First, it is impossible to envisage a significant decoupling of the Chinese economy and economies of the West that does not induce economic catastrophe. Second, there is little that Western countries can do to reshape China’s state-driven economic model or repressive human- and labour-rights regime.
Trade and investment deals cannot transform China into a Western-style market economy or turn it into a democracy. Our best hope, then, is to seek a new global regime that recognizes the diversity of economic and political settings without severely undermining the gains from international trade and investment.
None of this implies that Western countries should put human rights or political considerations aside when they engage China in the economic sphere. It simply means that the West should pursue more limited, more attainable, and ultimately more defensible goals. Two goals are paramount. First, trade and investment rules should ensure that Western firms and consumers are not directly complicit in human-rights abuses in China. Second, such rules should safeguard democratic countries against Chinese practices that could undermine their domestic institutional arrangements on labour, environment, technology, and national security. The objective ought to be to uphold and protect the West’s own values, rather than export them.
So, the relevant question on the CAI is not whether the EU will be able to alter the Chinese economic system or [repressive regime]... but whether the EU has given up its freedom to pursue policies that limit complicity in human rights and labour abuses or safeguard European national security and labour standards.
The European Commission has claimed that the CAI allows the EU to maintain its “policy space", especially in “sensitive" sectors such as energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and public services. In other areas, the EU is already fairly open to Chinese investment.
That raises the question of what the Chinese government thinks it is getting with the agreement. The answer seems to be that China is buying insurance against future restrictions in Europe. The agreement contains an arbitration scheme that enables the parties to bring violation complaints against each other... While the European Commission views this as a way to prevent Chinese backsliding from commitments, it could also serve as a means for the Chinese government to challenge specific entry barriers against Chinese firms.
An arbitration mechanism is necessary. But what if, say, a European country wants to bar a Chinese firm that treats its workers badly or operates in Xinjiang? What happens if European countries adopt tougher measures preventing Chinese firms with problematic labour or environmental practices from operating in the EU? Would the arbitration mechanism find these regulations compatible with the CAI? Similarly, how much deference will panels show to exceptions to market access based on “national security" considerations?
The answers are not clear. Much will depend on the final text of the CAI, and the degree to which arbitration panels choose to prioritize market access over countries’ self-described “public purpose."
In any case, neither the US desire to forge a united front against China, nor the reality that the CAI will fall short of creating a freer, more market-oriented China is a valid argument against the CAI. We should not judge the CAI by whether it enables Europe to export its system and values. We should judge it by whether it allows Europe to remain true to its own. ©2021/Project Syndicate
Dani Rodrik is professor of international political economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government