India mandated zero merchant discount rates (MDR) on payments made through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) in 2020. In September 2026, the government imposed an MDR on certain payments above ₹2,000, then deferred implementation without a new date.
India mandated zero merchant discount rates (MDR) on payments made through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) in 2020. In September 2026, the government imposed an MDR on certain payments above ₹2,000, then deferred implementation without a new date.
In 2025, it withdrew 14 quality control orders on industrial inputs over compliance and import costs. Fee prohibitions do not eliminate processing costs; mandatory standards can restrict competition. These reversals raise a question: were economic consequences examined before the rules were issued?
In 2025, it withdrew 14 quality control orders on industrial inputs over compliance and import costs. Fee prohibitions do not eliminate processing costs; mandatory standards can restrict competition. These reversals raise a question: were economic consequences examined before the rules were issued?
Elsewhere, authorities have capped trade margins on cancer medicines; the Reserve Bank of India has prohibited prepayment charges on specified loans; onion exports have faced bans and minimum export prices; the sugar industry faces administered prices, release quotas and export restrictions.
Electricity tariffs are partly cross-subsidized by industrial users; governments levy stamp duties on property sales and a higher securities transaction tax on derivatives. Each may serve a legitimate purpose, but consequences reach beyond the issuing department. Controls disrupt business plans; reversals force further adjustments. Such instability undermines investment planning.
Three shortcomings stand out.
First, policy often leaps from problem to prescription. Higher prices invite caps; shortages, export restrictions; quality concerns, mandatory certification. Yet, prices may reflect constrained supply, entry barriers or existing regulations, not market power.
Even genuine market failures do not justify every intervention. Medicine margin caps address visible prices, not necessarily procurement, distribution or insurance failures. Such measures treat symptoms, create distortions, prompt more subsidies, exemptions or restrictions. Departmental silos compound this: one ministry may subsidize production while another restricts inputs.
Second, economic costs are often hidden or displaced. Zero MDR benefits merchants, but infrastructure needs funding. Electricity cross-subsidies lower some bills, raising others. Stamp duties raise revenue but may discourage property transactions and mobility. Price-restricted businesses may adjust quality, supply or investment. Subsidies divert funds from other priorities; guarantees create future liabilities. Budgets record expenditure, not enterprises never founded or innovations never developed.
Even measures with negligible compliance costs can reshape competition and welfare, with costs falling beyond regulated businesses and intended beneficiaries.
Third, government runs on incentives too. Price controls and export restrictions offer immediate beneficiaries; costs disperse across consumers, taxpayers and future investors. Licensing can protect incumbents; subsidies create constituencies for continuation. Officials face scrutiny for inaction, seldom for investment that fails to materialize.
India needs an economic reasoning test for policy. A Niti Aayog committee recommended fewer approvals, risk-based inspections, policy stability and compliance and enforcement cost assessments.
But economic reasoning cannot depend on periodic committees. Fragmented responsibilities and gaps in analytical capacity and accountability complicate implementation. Government can simplify procedures yet retain price caps, quotas and market restrictions. The challenge is making appraisal permanent, assessing rationale, alternatives and wider consequences.
First, build on the Niti Aayog committee’s recommendations. Government should publish ministry-wise progress and fix accountability. The cabinet secretariat should add an Economic Impact and Incentives Statement to cabinet-note procedures. Major proposals should justify intervention, compare alternatives and assess effects on prices, competition, investment and future liabilities.
This scrutiny should extend beyond compliance costs to taxation, subsidies and restrictions, with comparable arrangements for statutory regulators.
Second, create an account of economic interventions. The department of economic affairs and Niti Aayog, with ministries and states, should periodically map taxes, subsidies, restrictions, price controls, guarantees and regulations in major sectors, starting with agriculture, energy and manufacturing.
These accounts should identify beneficiaries, ultimate payers, implicit transfers and conflicting policies, revealing how interventions collectively shape incentives.
Third, embed economic reasoning in civil-service recruitment and training. Public exams should test applied microeconomics, opportunity costs, regulatory incidence, government failure and political economy through practical policy problems. Mission Karmayogi should use actual Indian policy decisions and reversals.
Specialized training should cover taxation, pricing, regulatory arbitrage, agricultural supply incentives and procurement design. Officers should be assessed on evaluating alternatives, constructing counterfactuals and anticipating consequences.
Finally, make policy review and reversal part of administrative accountability. Major interventions should specify measurable objectives, review dates and exit conditions.
Good intentions cannot substitute for sound economic reasoning. Before issuing the next order, government must ask not only what it hopes to achieve, but what it will change, who will bear the consequences, and whether there is a better way.
The authors are, respectively, a public policy professional, and managing director, BowerGroupAsia.
