A small current account deficit may not offer immunity against rupee stress. India’s external constraints are changing. Policy will need to adapt.
The current account deficit is the central gauge of external vulnerability. It measures the economy’s net external financing requirement, which must be met by foreign capital inflows. When those inflows fall short, the adjustment ultimately falls on foreign exchange reserves, domestic asset prices or the currency.
On that basis, India appears substantially more insulated than it was 10 years ago. Its trend current account deficit has fallen below 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) from more than 4% a little over a decade ago. Even with oil around $100 a barrel, we expect the deficit to remain around 1% in 2026-27. Yet the rupee is under pressure.
Three factors explain this paradox.
First, global financing conditions have changed. Structurally higher interest rates and enormous demand for risk capital from global technology firms have made capital scarcer and costlier for emerging markets.
Returns on US corporate assets are rising much faster than those in India and broader Asia. Meanwhile, the 10-year US government debt offers a risk-free yield of 5%, versus 1% five or six years ago. A fully-hedged investment in India’s 10-year sovereign debt yields less than 4% today.
These factors give global investors little incentive to expand their emerging-market portfolios. Under such tight global financial conditions, India’s financially feasible trend current account deficit may be little more than 0.5% of GDP today, making historical benchmarks of 2.5% to 3% irrelevant.
Second, the current account’s composition matters, as net external financing and gross forex needs are not the same thing. The improvement in India’s current account deficit has been lopsided, driven largely by a growing services surplus and remittance inflows. Meanwhile, the core goods trade deficit, excluding oil and gold imports, has widened, by about 2% of GDP relative to its average over the past decade.
India’s high growth, in other words, has not come without greater external imbalance in goods trade. This is also visible in the import-to-GDP ratio, which has risen to about 25% from 20% five or six years ago. Growth, thus, continues to generate substantial gross demand for foreign currency even when the net current-account balance looks benign.
This is particularly true when growth is investment-led, given the economy’s reliance on imported capital goods, energy and intermediate inputs, demand for which is relatively insensitive to price in the short run.
Third, the rupee’s behaviour has changed. Gross financial-account flows are now almost as large as gross current-account flows. Alongside trade, relative asset returns, global risk appetite and portfolio allocations shape the rupee. Financial signals arrive much faster than trade flows, allowing expectations to shift rapidly.
That matters because expectations affect the behaviour of firms that actually buy and sell foreign currency. The prolonged weakness in financial flows, particularly equity, has entrenched expectations of rupee depreciation amid adverse global factors.
Importers and exporters then have asymmetric incentives. Importers expecting further depreciation may bring forward forex purchases, increase hedge ratios or lengthen hedge tenors. Exporters have the opposite incentive: converting forex receipts or locking in forward rates becomes less attractive. Their underlying imports and exports need not change for the balance of gross forex demand and supply to change.
Data provides evidence consistent with this behaviour. The Clearing Corporation of India’s client data shows aggregate importer hedge ratios rising since late 2024, especially around episodes when global shocks changed the expected path of the rupee. The weighted-average maturity of importer hedges has also risen. Meanwhile, forward forex purchases have increasingly exceeded forward sales.
This separates net external financing needs from gross forex-market pressure. A small current account deficit measures India’s net financing needs, not importers’ immediate forex demand or exporters’ willingness to supply dollars. So, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) may need to bridge a timing mismatch far larger than the overall balance-of-payments deficit suggests. Its combined spot and forward interventions have exceeded the deficit in recent quarters.
So, though the current account is relevant, assessing its composition, the global cost and availability of capital, and how financial flows and expectations interact with commercial forex flows are crucial.
RBI need not aggressively resist rupee depreciation. Persistent global shocks may warrant greater exchange-rate adjustment after all. Intervention may work better by creating a perception of two-way risk than by defending predictable levels: once markets can anticipate RBI’s response, its deterrent effect weakens. Unequivocally hawkish monetary policy communication can reinforce this approach.
India’s external vulnerability has not disappeared; it has changed form. A smaller current account deficit is welcome, but costly global capital and financial flows that reshape importer and exporter behaviour can turn a small financing gap into outsized currency pressure. These are the external constraints policymakers must manage.
The author is senior economist, ANZ Bank.
