Israel and Hamas have something in common
Summary
They both want to avoid a ceasefire collapse, for a few more weeks.
DIPLOMACY is often the art of kicking the can down the road. That was always the case with the truce between Israel and Hamas, which took effect on January 19th. The first phase of the deal paused the war for six weeks and promised the release of 33 of the 98 Israeli hostages being held in Gaza. A permanent ceasefire would not come until phase two, the details of which still had to be negotiated.
The agreement was meant to create its own momentum. The release of some hostages would galvanise Israeli support for a deal to free the rest. After six weeks of calm in Gaza, Israel and Hamas would be under enormous pressure not to resume fighting. Negotiations over phase two would be hard—but they would happen.
That was the idea, at least. Things have not gone quite to plan. The deal has largely held up, despite some delays and violations on both sides. But the first phase ends on March 1st. Talks over the second should have begun by February 3rd and concluded by February 22nd. They have yet to start. Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, would be happy if they never do. Whether the wobbly ceasefire survives will now depend largely on whether Donald Trump wants it to.
As The Economist went to press, it was possible to imagine three broad scenarios for the coming days. The first is that negotiators manage to finish the phase-two talks in record time. That seems implausible. Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s Middle East envoy, had been due in the region on February 26th. He postponed his visit (officially because he was busy with Russia-Ukraine diplomacy) and is unlikely to arrive before March 2nd. The first phase might thus end before Israel and Hamas even start negotiations on the second, let alone finish them.
A second scenario is that the ceasefire collapses altogether: Israel or Hamas might accuse the other of violating the deal and resume fighting. That seems unlikely, too. Hamas would prefer to keep Gaza calm during the Ramadan period, which will run through most of March. Mr Netanyahu and his right-wing allies might wish to restart the war, but they would have little support in Israel or in Washington. Most Israelis back the ceasefire. Mr Trump says he does as well.
That leaves a third option: keep kicking the can. The deal allows Israel and Hamas to extend phase one indefinitely, so long as they are negotiating over phase two. Mr Netanyahu supports an extension. So does America. Hamas officials outside Gaza say they may be willing to release a few more tranches of hostages to prolong the truce. That would buy at least several weeks for negotiations over what comes next.
But that offers only a temporary reprieve. Mr Netanyahu is desperate to keep the deal in limbo, lest his far-right allies, who oppose a permanent ceasefire, bolt from the coalition. He removed the heads of Israel’s security services from the negotiating team; leading the talks instead will be Ron Dermer, his confidant, who also opposes ending the war. The prime minister would be content to extend phase one until all the hostages are released. Naturally, that is a non-starter for Hamas: the group would be left with no leverage over Israel and no agreement to end the war.
The messages from Washington are ever more muddled. Mr Witkoff says he is optimistic about getting to phase two. But he told CBS, an American tv network, on February 23rd that Hamas would have to accept exile as part of a permanent truce: “Hamas has to go, they’ve gotta leave."
Perhaps this was just posturing to gain leverage. If it is a serious demand, though, Hamas is unlikely to accede. Nor is it clear which country in the region might be willing to accept a group of battle-hardened radicals: the exile of Palestinian militants to Beirut in the 1970s helped fuel the Lebanese civil war.
Then there is the question of what happens after a permanent ceasefire. Mr Trump continues to insist on his ludicrous plan to depopulate Gaza and build a resort. He recently shared an ai-generated video on social media that envisioned the enclave as a gaudier version of Dubai. It showed Elon Musk noshing on hummus, a topless Mr Netanyahu sunbathing by the pool and a golden statue of Mr Trump towering over a city square. There were even some bearded women belly-dancing on a beach, an unexpectedly woke flourish.
Back in the real world, a group of Arab states met in Riyadh on February 21st to discuss their own post-war plan. It calls for a committee of Palestinian technocrats to oversee reconstruction. Hamas would be excluded. The group might be willing to go along with such a scheme—but it does not want to relinquish its weapons, which means Israel is unlikely to assent.
Yair Lapid, the Israeli opposition leader, offered his own fanciful plan to a hawkish Washington think-tank. He called for Egypt to take ownership of Gaza for at least eight years. In exchange, its foreign debts would be paid off. Mr Lapid admitted he did not ask the Egyptians if they wanted to control Gaza, which they do not (they had their own unhappy experience running the enclave from 1949 to 1967). Nor did he explain who would cover Egypt’s $155bn in external debt: it is always easier to negotiate with other people’s money.
Whether any of these plans are realistic will be a moot point if the truce falls apart. Mr Netanyahu, a chronic procrastinator, will seek to drag out the first phase until Hamas gives him an excuse to terminate it. Mr Trump played a vital role in forcing him to accept the initial deal. He will have to decide if he wants to do so again.
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