It might be hard to imagine that West Asia is looking beyond Washington while it is being massively disrupted by a US-led war. But that is exactly what is happening—most recently through this month’s Mecca Agreement, a three-nation mutual defence pact signed by Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan.
This pact is both less and more than it seems. On one hand, the agreement insists that “an attack on one is an attack on all,” deliberately echoing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (Nato) Article 5. It binds together major regional powers, each of which brings significant strengths to the table: bottomless funds in the Saudi case; a muscular defence-industrial complex in Türkiye ’s; and, in Pakistan’s, ample trained manpower and a nuclear deterrent.
But regardless of what the paperwork says, this is no ‘Sunni Nato.’ True alliances are more than treaties. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed one on mutual defence last year, but it didn’t seem to be triggered when Iran started firing missiles across the Gulf, nor did it seem to deter Tehran’s escalation.
In this case, it is hard to understand exactly where and when these countries would come to one another’s aid. Would it happen if the Houthis violated Saudi borders? Or if India and Pakistan had another confrontation? Alliances require countries to be willing to fight for each other—and in recent decades, only the US has been willing to run that risk.
These three countries have relied on that American backstop for decades. Türkiye remains in Nato, but the bilateral relationship is fraught; Riyadh has always viewed Washington as its primary security guarantor; and America’s off-and-on embrace of Pakistan has shaped that country’s worldview, rarely for the better.
As Washington makes it clear it is willing to disrupt West Asia rather than stabilize it, the Mecca Agreement is best seen as a formal admission that all three signatories will have to find new partners and alignments.
This is not easy. They don’t have that many stability-loving friends to draw upon, partly because of their own poor choices.
Türkiye has its hands in multiple messes across the Caucasus and Mediterranean, Pakistan is far too comfortable thinking of terrorists as ideological fellow travellers and Saudi money has long supported religious extremists around the world, although it has tried to dial that down in recent years.
These are revisionist powers, ill-at-ease heirs to an order that they never really loved.
But the purpose of this pact is not to upend the regional order. It’s an attempt to freeze or reverse the current turmoil. None of the three is interested in accelerating the chaos, the way Iran might be. Türkiye , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may resent the regional arrangements they inherited, but they also know that a permanently ungovernable West Asia doesn’t benefit them.
Powers unhappy with their status quo will meddle in each other’s affairs, bully their neighbours and pursue imperial or revanchist dreams—but most of them will stop viewing such provocations as useful the moment they threaten trade routes, energy access or their own domestic legitimacy.
At that point, even restless leaders begin to look for someone willing to share the burden of stabilizing their neighbourhood.
For decades, that has been the US. Washington’s retreat from that role will inevitably produce this kind of faux alliance: a middle-power attempt to recreate America’s role piecemeal, with every partner throwing something into the pot in the hope that whatever emerges is lasting and effective.
So questions about what the Mecca Agreement will look like in practice, however sensible, tend to miss the larger point. With no secretariat, no unified command and insufficient trust, it might survive only as a platform to talk shop.
But even an obligation that the three consult one another in a crisis is not nothing. Over time, such self-interested improvisation might create a new geometry of restraint in one of the world’s most troubled regions.
I’m not that hopeful, however. The problem with middle powers is they all want to be great powers. Pakistan’s self-image, as the only Muslim-majority nuclear power, is elevated enough. Both Saudi and Türkiye, meanwhile, have long assumed that they alone deserve to lead the Sunni world. The House of Saud believes that its role in Mecca and Medina gives it certain privileges, but Istanbul remembers the four centuries when it was the seat of the caliphate.
The reason they have been complaisant allies in the past is that each was willing, regardless of these supposed claims to prominence, to accept the US as a senior partner. But that does not mean they will accept each other as equals. If they ever do, then the Mecca Agreement stands a chance of success. ©Bloomberg
The author is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist.