Why India has refused to take on Russia over Ukraine
Summary
Foreign policy is driven by geopolitics and we have the far more serious threat of China to contend withAs tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine escalate to levels not seen since the Cold War, India has walked a diplomatic tightrope. Western officials and analysts have sought to rope India in as part of a unified worldwide opposition to Russia’s large-scale military mobilization and incursions into Ukraine. But India has stuck to a calculated stance based on its independent assessment and equations with parties to the raging conflict in former Soviet spaces.
This, in turn, has generated Western laments that India has abandoned principles and values and is condoning Russian President Vladimir Putin’s blatant attempt to rebuild the Soviet or czarist empire through brute force. At the Munich Security Conference on 19 February, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar was asked why India keeps pointing fingers at China’s violation of the sovereignty of smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific, but has not denounced Russia’s intimidation and meddling in Europe.
Jaishankar’s response was that India did not see the tussle between Russia and the West in Europe as analogous to China’s hegemonic push for dominance in Asia. Indeed, the parallel is flawed because Russia’s economy is tiny compared to that of China. Russia cannot sustain a costly military campaign of conquest of all of eastern Europe. Its annual defence budget averages about $60 billion, which pales in front of China’s defence expenditure of over $250 billion per year. Moreover, Russia can’t overturn the fundamental balance of power in Europe, as it has to contend with a phalanx of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) troops and hi-tech weaponry placed all along its western land borders, from the three Baltic republics in the north and Poland in the centre to Romania and Bulgaria in the south.
Putin has been portrayed as a modern-day Hitler in the Western liberal discourse, but Russia lacks the hard power capabilities to gobble up the whole of Europe. Many in India are less alarmist. They sense that Putin seems to be driving a hard bargain over Ukraine to push Nato back through a show of force without overstepping red lines that could draw Russia into an unwinnable quagmire.
Surely, the sovereignty of any member state of the United Nations should be preserved. But India does not buy the Western narrative of an all-out ideological struggle to save a defenceless democratic Ukraine from an insatiable authoritarian monster called Russia. India abstained on a Western resolution in the UN Security Council intended to apply pressure on Russia with the assertion that there are “legitimate security interests of all countries", implying that Ukraine should not be invaded, but Russian grievances about Nato’s eastward expansion must also be addressed.
At the Munich conference, Jaishankar also added that “principles and interests are balanced" and hit back saying that “people in this part of the world" (the West) have not been all that principled. History bears witness that there has rarely been universal adherence to law and morality. Often, we see selective application of these ideas when it suits the interests of powerful countries. For example, the US has condoned and shielded its allies that committed war crimes. The heart-wrenching human tragedy of the war in Yemen is a recent illustration of Washington supporting, financing and arming partners in Latin America, West Asia, Africa and other parts of Asia despite their murderous conduct. Recall the oft-cited quote attributed to US leaders talking about their counterparts in allied nations, “He may be a bastard, but he’s our bastard."
India’s take on the Russia-Ukraine imbroglio is also determined by Miles’s Law: ‘Where you stand depends on where you sit.’ Given India’s geopolitical location in the Indo-Pacific, its chief focus is on deterring Chinese expansionism and ruthless push for mastery over terrain and maritime spaces around India. The confrontation over Ukraine’s possible Nato tilt does not have a significant impact on India’s national security or power-projection goals.
Yes, India has robust trade and steadily-growing security ties with Europe, but its core security goal is a balance of power in Asia that has been strained by China’s drive for hegemony. India needs Russian weaponry and cooperation to ‘internally balance’ Chinese influence in Eurasia. India is uncomfortable if its Western partners get drawn into the diversion of fighting Russia over Ukraine, neglecting the reality that there is only one great power other than the US today, China, which seems keen on global supremacy.
The US itself has labelled China ‘the pacing threat’, i.e. “the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States." Having to contend with such a China, whose tens of thousands of troops have amassed on India’s northern doorstep in aggressive formations for the past two years, India cannot get into the business of condemning Russia over Ukraine, which is over 6,400km away. Lest Western pundits forget, New Delhi has its hands full with a serious and continuous crisis vis-à-vis Beijing’s ambitions.
India has sound geopolitical compulsions as well as reasonable cynicism about the application of universal moral values to back up its position on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Developments in eastern Europe are unfortunate, but the best India could do there is advocate a negotiated diplomatic settlement. The future of Europe’s security is not going to be decided by India. Seen from New Delhi, the future of Asia’s security is a much more pressing concern.
Sreeram Chaulia is dean at the Jindal School of International Affairs