This column usually addresses economic issues. However, in the present context, economic outcomes will be largely determined by the current political conjuncture.
Domestically, India is on the cusp of a new political phase following the mobilization of a young generation at Jantar Mantar recently, triggered by repeated and disruptive leaks of examination papers, which soon morphed into a broader demand for government accountability and reforms to fix a broken education system.
Globally, we are at the threshold of an emerging new world order, the contours of which are still uncertain, the old order having been disrupted by the very powers that established it at the end of World War II.
This column is the first part of a two-part series that looks at the possible main elements of this emerging new global order and how India could best position itself in it. This part mainly deals with the most complex of emerging regional structures, the scenario in West Asia.
The second part will discuss similar structures which may—or may not—be emerging in other parts of the world and how India should position itself in the new global geopolitical architecture of the 21st century.
The central fault line of the emerging new order is the competition between the US, the receding hegemon, and China, the rising one. In my previous Mint column, I had discussed how the US had itself, ironically, helped China challenge its hegemony.
It is tempting to extend this binary competition to a global fault line between a Western alliance led by the US but including countries like Japan, Australia and South Korea on one side, and an Eastern alliance led by China but including countries like Russia on the other.
However, such a frame of reference would be quite misleading because instead of any such neat and binary global fault line, what we are witnessing is the emergence of varying and sometimes overlapping alliances around different conflicts—or rivalries—in different geographies of the world. The most complex of these emerging regional structures is in West Asia.
The Israeli attack on Gaza was initially seen as a response to the shocking Hamas terror strike on 7 October 2023, which left over 1,200 persons dead, mostly civilians, over 5,000 injured and some 250 taken hostage.
However, it soon became clear that Israel’s war was actually a genocidal assault on Palestinians in Gaza. Till date, over 74,000 Palestinians have been killed, mostly women and children. Many more have died through starvation and disease, lacking proper food, sanitation or shelter due to an Israeli blockade of aid.
Taken along with continuing attacks on Palestinians and their properties in the West Bank by Israeli settlers, implicitly encouraged by the Israeli government, what we are seeing is a rollout of the extreme right-wing agenda of ‘Greater Israel’ that would occupy Palestinian land ‘from the river to the sea’ (and perhaps beyond the Jordan River too).
A ceasefire brokered by Qatar, Türkiye and Egypt, backed by the US, in October 2025 stopped large-scale killing, though the bombing, drone attacks and sniping have not completely stopped.
A 15-point peace plan brokered by US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, and supported by the United Nations, was accepted by Hamas on 30 July 2026. It envisages administration of Gaza by Palestinian technocrats and a phased disarming of Hamas calibrated with the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces . But Israel rejected the proposal.
Meanwhile, Israel launched a direct attack on Iran in June 2025, with the US joining Israel in bombing Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. This was a prelude to the launch of a full-scale war on Iran by the US- Israel alliance on 28 February 2026.
Iran responded by broadening the conflict to a regional war, striking US bases and vital infrastructure in all countries across West Asia allied with the US. Iran’s ally Hezbollah attacked Israel from Southern Lebanon.
The regime in Iran has not only survived the war but maintained a blockade of Hormuz. This has severely affected Gulf exporters and other countries.
Iran’s successful resistance is attributable to the tenacity of its people and the survival of a harsh regime. But it has also been quietly helped by China and Russia. The audacious aggression of Israel on the other side has been enabled by massive US support: financial, military and diplomatic. Israel has also cleverly leveraged Shia-Sunni rivalries in West Asia to initiate US-supported alliances with Sunni countries against a Shia Iran—the Abraham Accords.
That situation is now changing. US allies in the region have realized that the US cannot offer them much protection, while Iran’s stature has grown following its successful resistance.
Leading Sunni powers in the region, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt, may join other Sunni countries to seek accommodation with Iran, building on the China-brokered restoration of diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran in 2023.
Meanwhile, rising US public resentment against the Iran war has led to some rethinking in America about unconditional support for Israel. Pushing Netanyahu aside, the US accepted a temporary peace deal with Iran brokered by Pakistan. Occasional violations notwithstanding, a tense peace prevails.
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye have announced the Makkah Agreement. A joint statement indicates agreement that an attack on any one country will be considered an attack against all three. The three partners also aim to jointly develop defence capability and collective security.
This marks a major shift in West Asian geopolitics. Henceforth, US allies in the region are likely to be guided more by their own security concerns than US interests. Washington’s influence in the region is likely to moderate, while that of China may rise, Pakistan being its closest ally in this part of the world.
Israel’s aggressive ambitions will be curbed and, hopefully, so will Shia-Sunni rivalries, giving peace and prosperity a chance.
This is the first of a two-part series.
The author is chairman, Centre for Development Studies.