Regulation is not the enemy of a market economy; it is its catalyst. Markets without credible rules do not become ‘free.’ They become predatory, then illiquid and eventually wither away. India knows what good regulation requires. The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission in 2013 crystallized four essentials: cost-benefit analysis, public consultation, reasoned orders and periodic review.
India’s problem is not ignorance of these canons. It is the habits that override them. This week’s insurance consultation paper offered a revealing exhibit. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (Irdai) proposed segment-wise commission caps, lower expense limits and new disclosure norms. By the close of trading, the country’s largest online insurance marketplace had suffered its biggest single-day fall, with more than ₹25,000 crore of market value erased at the day’s low.
Insurance policy misselling, opaque practices and dismal claim experiences have long been a problem left to fester. Then, one fine day, the regulator punished an entire distribution ecosystem for those failures. No rule had changed. The stock market was not just pricing Irdai’s proposals, but old habits.
Five ‘anti-canons’ can be discerned across India’s regulatory landscape.
Reversals masquerade as recalibration: In 2023, Irdai abolished product-level commission caps and distribution businesses built their economics around that framework. Three years later, tighter caps have been proposed. A review was due. A policy shift requires more: evidence of what failed, why the framework no longer works and how the transition will be managed. It is thus easier to ‘recalibrate.’
It’s a national pattern. Angel tax was imposed, exempted, extended and then abolished. Laptop import licensing was introduced and reversed within weeks. Online money gaming moved from a 28% tax to prohibition. Similarly with the principles behind UPI and its merchant discount rate. These episodes differ, but share a consequence: businesses can adapt to stringent rules, but unpredictable shifts raise investment costs. Markets can price a rule, but not a regulator’s changing mind.
Surprise as a regulatory instrument: Brokerages find the proposed caps far more severe than expected. The market, therefore, discovered policy through stock prices rather than a transparent discussion. A comment window opened after the shock now risks becoming a consultation theatre. Consultation must precede draft proposals.
Regulators should publish an annual agenda, attach impact assessments to major proposals and provide glide paths where adjustment is material. When a consultation paper moves a listed company’s value by 30% in a session, the regulator must ask whether its communication was adequate.
The fringe writes rules for the compliant: Dark patterns and misselling can’t be defended. But one platform’s misconduct cannot automatically justify a burden on every distribution channel. One bad actor must not create a presumption of guilt against all participants. Tax enforcement has made a similar error by treating taxpayers as potential fraudsters. A blanket rule may be easier to supervise, but administrative convenience is not consumer protection. The regulator must distinguish harmful conduct from legitimate activity and calibrate the remedy to the risk.
Silos are regulated in isolation: The same state that declared ‘Insurance for All by 2047’ has proposed compressing the economics of the distribution network. Penetration cannot expand sustainably if the channels delivering it turn unviable. This was part of Irdai’s own rationale in 2023 for axeing commission caps.
The tension is wider. The securities regulator may curb derivative market risks while the country seeks deeper markets. Banking supervision may tighten its approach to fintech while public policy promotes inclusion and innovation. Each regulator may optimize its silo. The economy pays for the interactions, while no institution adds them up. Coordination must be a design requirement, not an afterthought.
Regulatory convenience acts as the purpose of regulation: Turf wars between overlapping authorities and compliance formats designed for a supervisor’s dashboard can shift costs without improving outcomes. Rules without review dates survive because reviews require hard work. Blanket caps become attractive as they are easier to administer than targeted remedies that call for judgement.
The regulated exist to serve the market. The market must not be made to serve the regulator. Proportionality, accountability and periodic review must apply to the rule-maker as much as to rule-takers.
The five anti-canons share one root: a regulator’s immediate priority displaces the market’s need for policy predictability. The remedy is not another commission. What is missing is the enforcement of canonical discipline among rule-makers: the need for an impact assessment before intervention, consultation before finalization, reasoned decisions and meaningful reviews.
In a chemistry lab, a catalyst accelerates a reaction without being consumed by it. A regulator that frequently alters the rules would risk becoming a source of the very volatility it exists to dampen. India does not need less regulation, but rules that behave like a catalyst: present in every transaction, consumed by none.
The authors are, respectively, a corporate advisor and author of ‘Family and Dhanda’; and a Supreme Court advocate and former IRS officer.
