Russia-India-China: A triumvirate that’s too fragile to endure
American pressure is a unifying factor, no doubt, but such a power triad—dreamt up by Moscow—can’t be expected to last without cohesion. Right now, Beijing and New Delhi are far apart and China’s ties with Pakistan are no small matter for India.
A Russia-India-China [triumvirate], an idea floated in the 1990s as a counterweight to the US, is being revived today as a way for the three countries to ride out the storm of President Donald Trump’s trade war, [it seems]. But old suspicions mean it is unlikely to endure. Despite their shared grievances with Washington, their partnership is more a marriage of convenience.
That reality will be on display this week when the three nuclear powers converge in Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. The Kremlin is pressing for a long-awaited trilateral meeting. If the troika did find new life, it would send a powerful signal that the geopolitical heavyweights are aligning in the face of US pressure. But the inherent tensions between India and China, and economic differences between the three, make that outcome unlikely.
Also Read: India-US standoff over Russian oil: Let’s not waver but resolve it
That pressure is most acute for India. Until recently a key American partner, it has borne the brunt of Trump’s tariffs. He doubled duties on exports to 50%—due to go into effect on 27 August—as punishment for its purchases of Russian oil.
Beijing, once Washington’s primary target, is enjoying a temporary reprieve, but is stuck in a long-term strategic competition. And Russia, battered by sanctions and bogged down in Ukraine, is on the hunt for friends to blunt its isolation.
Moscow first dreamt up the idea of RIC, as it was dubbed, in the 1990s. The [proposed] coalition looked formidable on paper—three nations with huge economies and populations. In practice, it’s always been undermined by mistrust, above all between rivals India and China.
Among the biggest sticking points is their long-running border dispute. They have been at loggerheads over an ill-defined 3,488km frontier in the Himalayan region. In 2020, the two clashed violently in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, leaving soldiers dead on both sides in the bloodiest fighting in decades. Diplomatic ties froze, with New Delhi suspending tourist visas for Chinese nationals and imposing restrictions on tech imports from China.
Also Read: Asian synergy: A patch-up with Beijing would serve India’s interests well
Trump’s tariffs are nudging them closer. Last week, they agreed to explore demarcating their disputed border, a key move toward resolving the territorial dispute. Strains around visas have eased and China has expressed solidarity with India on exports. But the risk of future standoffs can’t be discounted.
While serious violence may have been averted for now, a lasting rapprochement is unlikely. It’s hard for New Delhi to be fully confident of Beijing’s intentions, especially in light of its military assertiveness in areas like the South China Sea and Taiwan. China is also far too close to Pakistan for India’s comfort. Beijing has become Islamabad’s most important defence partner since the end of the Cold War. During a clash with India in May, Pakistan claimed Chinese-made J-10C jets were used to shoot down five Indian fighter jets during the conflict. New Delhi [rejected Pakistan’s claims but] said Beijing provided its rival with air defence and satellite support. This alignment deepens India’s security anxieties and reinforces its distrust of China.
Setting security aside, the economic logic doesn’t work in New Delhi’s favour. India depends on US technology, capital and supply chains—which neither Russia nor China can replace. America is also the most important market for Indian goods by a wide margin. In 2024, consumers bought $77.5 billion worth of Indian goods, according to a Bank of Baroda report. Chinese and Russian purchases were only a fraction of that.
Also Read: Bide your time: China’s playing a long game in its trade talks with America
Also, Moscow is much closer to Beijing. Since Western sanctions were imposed in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, bilateral trade between the two has surged to record highs, surpassing $200 billion last year. Businesses are increasingly connected to the Chinese financial system through the use of the yuan and services like UnionPay cards. For India, joining such a bloc would mean being the junior partner—hardly an appealing prospect.
That hasn’t stopped Moscow from trying to rejuvenate [the idea of RIC]. In May, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said “the time has come for the revival" of the troika. Beijing has also backed the initiative, saying it could uphold peace, security and stability in the world.
Resurrecting such a bloc could pose a challenge to the US if it results in more coordinated action. But what binds these nations is necessity, not trust.
The SCO gathering in Tianjin might offer the optics of warmer ties, but it would be more symbolism than substance. RIC is an inherently fragile three-way relationship, one that could unravel if American pressure diminishes. ©Bloomberg
The author is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China
topics
