Opinion
Tribunal reforms hold the key to efficient dispute resolution in India
Summary
- The performance of tribunals has been abysmal, but this need not be so. Much depends on the autonomy they’re given to function effectively as quasi-judicial bodies that can relieve courts of their case burden.
Tribunals were meant to be India’s answer to an overburdened judicial system—a fast-track mechanism to resolve disputes efficiently outside the traditional civil court structure. However, the idea of tribunals being a faster and better alternative to court cases has not worked out as expected.
Unless we as a society address its shortcomings, we will only be leaping from the frying pan into the fire: i.e., we would be left with another hurdle in India’s already slow-moving justice system.
Tribunals were established to handle exclusive matters requiring specialized knowledge. The rationale was clear: quicker resolution, expert adjudication and a reduced burden on courts. Yet, instead of serving as efficient quasi-judicial bodies, many tribunals have turned into non- performers themselves.
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This malaise cuts across not just one tribunal, but several. Such as the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) and Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL).
The 2017 Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) merger with the NCLAT led to an unsustainable caseload for the latter. The NCLAT, already tasked with appeals under the Companies Act and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, was further burdened with competition-law cases. As a result, disposal rates fell. In addition, the benefit of specialization on competition matters was lost.
The DRT was established to facilitate the swift resolution of financial disputes and expedite loan recoveries. However, with over 215,431 pending cases, the objective of fast-tracking disputes has been defeated. The asset recovery rate of financial institutions in 2022-23 fell to 9.2%.
Similarly, APTEL, envisioned as an efficient dispute resolution forum for the power sector, is struggling with vacancies. This has led to a backlog that delays crucial energy sector reforms and regulatory decisions.
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Further, the judiciary’s repeated intervention in tribunal matters has raised fundamental concerns. When the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) ruled on the adjusted gross revenue (AGR) dispute, the Supreme Court overruled it, raising questions about the legal standing of tribunals.
If key rulings are consistently overturned, tribunals risk being seen as ineffective intermediaries rather than authoritative dispute-resolution bodies. Not to mention the fact that the AGR issue handled by the Supreme Court will have imperilled the telecom market if some operators wind up, thus reducing competition.
Adding to these concerns, the inefficiencies of tribunals have wider economic ramifications. Delays in resolving disputes create uncertainty. If tribunals fail to function effectively, the resulting economic harm militates against India’s financial stability and efficiency—not just in theory, but also in terms of lived reality. Addressing these systemic failures is therefore a question of strengthening economic governance.
Moreover, the abolition and merger of several tribunals and the transfer of their powers to existing judicial bodies has not necessarily resulted in efficiency. Rather, it has added to the burden of conventional courts. This shift raises an essential question: Is ‘tribunalization’ a failed experiment at the conceptual level or is its failure a result of poor selection of members, lack of infrastructure, improper execution and government apathy?
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Administrative tribunals like the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) were set up to resolve disputes concerning government-employee matters efficiently and with finality. However, dissatisfied employees prefer to file appeals at high courts under Article 226/227, which raises their workload. In its 162nd report, the Law Commission recommended the constitution of a National Administrative Appellate Tribunal, positioned above high courts, but no progress has been made on it.
In 2001, Arun Jaitley, who was India’ minister of law and justice then, proposed the establishment of a central tribunal division within the ministry to streamline the functioning of tribunals. Earlier, in 1997, the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs Union of India emphasized the need of an independent authority to oversee the administration of tribunals. A well-defined and structured framework should be introduced by the government with a clear timeline for its implementation.
Moreover, the trend of appointing retired judges and bureaucrats to tribunals reflects a flawed approach. While judicial experience is undoubtedly valuable, the supposed technical members are mainly retired administrators. These practices raise concerns about post-retirement placements, which have been criticized by both parliamentarians and judges. Alas, this malaise runs across our entire system of economic governance. The erstwhile Planning Commission had tried to rectify it, but the idea could not get traction.
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The Law Commission, in its 272nd report in 2017, recommended the establishment of a central nodal agency under the ministry of law and justice. Though it did not explicitly define its formulation, it underscored the need for an independent regulatory body to oversee tribunals.
Further, the government could consider introducing double shifts in tribunals (and courts). This idea was discussed in 2011, but never taken forward. A structured shift system can help clear backlogs faster and ensure speedier resolution of all matters pending with tribunals and courts.
Although tribunals like the CAT, Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions and ITAT have performed relatively better in resolving disputes, the fate of tribunals in India ultimately hinges on the government’s willingness to prioritize judicial autonomy. Without that, tribunalization will remain nothing more than a half-filled glass, vying to get filled up.
Pragya Tiwari of CUTS contributed to this article.
The authors are, respectively, vice president of Pune International Centre and secretary general of CUTS International.
