India has no shortage of financial regulators, regulations or coordinating institutions. What appears questionable is whether anyone assesses their cumulative consequences for the financial system. Markets are interconnected, but their regulation often appears compartmentalized. Individually defensible interventions can, therefore, produce collectively suboptimal outcomes.
The problem is institutional fragmentation, overlapping jurisdictions, regulatory gaps and inadequate systemic diagnosis.
Consider the Additional Tier-1 (AT-1) bond episode. The Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (Sebi) 2021 decision to treat perpetual AT-1 bonds as having a deemed maturity of 100 years for mutual fund valuation reflected legitimate investor-protection concerns.
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and banking industry argued that this departed from market practice of valuing these instruments closer to their first call date, potentially impairing the market for bank capital instruments. A subsequent phased glide path softened the immediate impact.
The substantive change came in August 2024 when Sebi permitted mutual funds to value AT-1 bonds on a yield-to-call basis, while retaining deemed-maturity treatment for other purposes. The Supreme Court’s October 2026 decision setting aside Yes Bank’s 2020 AT-1 bond write-down has reopened questions about loss absorption, investor protection and the credibility of bank capital instruments.
The issue is not which regulator was right, but why investor protection, bank capital adequacy and a viable domestic bond market prove so difficult to reconcile from the start.
Gold offers another example. At a time when India faces external-sector pressures and a weak rupee, encouraging financial products that facilitate gold investments deserve wider macroeconomic assessment.
Gold exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and permission to include gold as part of equity funds offer convenient exposure, but underlying demand can drive up physical gold imports.
Restrictions imposed by some mutual funds on fresh gold ETF subscriptions amid foreign-exchange concerns illustrate the tension between investor demand and external-sector management. Therefore, we need to assess financial products alongside external financing needs.
Insurance misselling presents a different problem. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (Irdai) regulates insurers, while RBI oversees banks that frequently distribute insurance products.
The incentives of banks, insurers and intermediaries may not align with those of policyholders. Product rules cannot address misselling unless distribution incentives, bancassurance and banking governance are examined together. The question is why there has been no action for so long till Irdai very recently, under a new chairperson, wanted to address the issue.
The Clearing Corporation of India Ltd (CCIL), a systemically important financial market infrastructure facility and central counterparty for government securities, money-market and foreign-exchange transactions, operates under RBI authorization pursuant to the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
Its regulation under a legislation originally conceived to cover payment systems raises a larger question: whether India’s statutory and supervisory architecture adequately addresses the distinctive systemic risks posed by a central counterparty whose operations are deeply embedded in the country’s financial markets.
This allocation has an institutional rationale though—CCIL operates in wholesale markets and payment infrastructure. But should the underlying transactions, rather than the systemic function, determine the regulatory perimeter?
When clearing corporations perform comparable functions across interconnected markets, is fragmented supervision appropriate? Should CCIL stay under RBI supervision, come under Sebi, or be subject to a clearly articulated joint oversight framework?
In the foreign-exchange market, arbitrageurs help reconcile prices across markets. Restrictions on speculative positions may be justified, but when they also constrain legitimate arbitrage, the market’s capacity to correct pricing inefficiencies is impaired. When cash-market interest-rate signals diverge from rates implied by forward pricing, how can markets function efficiently if mechanisms connecting them are constrained?
Forward premia are fundamentally linked to interest rates, and not a straightforward forecast of exchange-rate movements. Funding constraints and hedging imbalances can drive them away from theoretical relationships. Suppressing a visible disturbance without understanding its causes risks treating the symptom but aggravating the disease.
These examples suggest a common deficiency—inadequate systemic diagnosis. Policymaking can resemble an engineering exercise; individual problems are isolated without examining the larger system. Financial markets, however, are adaptive social and economic systems. Participants respond, risks migrate and interventions alter market conditions. The whole is not necessarily the sum of its parts.
This brings us to the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC), meant to promote financial stability, inter-regulatory coordination and financial-sector development. Yet, if regulatory overlaps, gaps and conflicting incentives continue to surface across banking, securities, insurance and foreign exchange, what is the FSDC achieving beyond institutional consultation?
Regulatory independence must be respected. But independence cannot become institutional isolation. Nor should coordination amount to exchanging views after individual decisions have already been taken.
The finance minister’s call for more frequent FSDC meetings is welcome. But frequency is not effectiveness. The test is whether it undertakes systemic diagnosis, anticipates cross-market consequences and reconciles competing objectives before interventions. India needs to move from coordination by consultation to coordination by systemic assessment. Major interventions should be assessed for their effects on other markets, intermediation, liquidity and the wider economy.
The author is a former central banker.
