Can the U.S. Find Allies to Help in Gaza?

Not long before Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in the Turkish capital in early January to discuss the war in Gaza, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “is richer than Hitler" and gets “all sorts of support" from the U.S. The Turkish leader has a long history of blood-curdling rhetoric that links Israelis with Nazis and has long supported Hamas in word and deed. Still, after his meetings in Turkey, Blinken told reporters that “it’s clear that Turkey is prepared to play a positive, productive role in the work that needs to happen the day after the conflict ends."

Nor did the Secretary of State fare well through the rest of his trip, returning home with very little to show for his efforts. Indeed, if Blinken’s recent tour of the Middle East revealed anything, it is that America’s regional partners are deeply reluctant to help with President Joe Biden’s diplomatic push to “reinvigorate" the Palestinian Authority (PA), extend its rule to the Gaza Strip and cajole the Israelis and Palestinians to resume long-suspended negotiations to end their conflict. Even the plan to end the war announced by the Arab states last weekend is little more than a warmed-over peace initiative that has been rattling around since 2002. Still, even though it is tempting to write off America’s regional partners as timorous, weak and skeptical, much of the problem lies with Washington.

The Biden administration would have a better chance of securing help from friends in the region if it was not so passive. It is not that the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and Bahrain are opposed to Biden’s effort to revive the PA and the two-state solution. But no one is going to lend a hand to the U.S. unless Washington takes decisive action to reform the PA, confront Iran’s “axis of resistance" and isolate the region’s arsonists, notably Qatar and Turkey.

The region’s key players are hemmed between domestic political support for the Palestinians and their strategic ties with the U.S. The Jordanians, who have long and deep ties to the U.S., have done nothing except issue increasingly strident condemnations of Israel from Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and Queen Rania. No doubt this is a function of the political pressure in a country where a majority of citizens, including the queen, are of Palestinian origin.

In Egypt, President Abdel Fatah el Sisi is surely aware that any number of groups that were involved in instigating the 2011 uprising against President Hosni Mubarak originated in Palestinian solidarity committees that sprung up during the second intifada in the early 2000s. He has thus been cautious about working with the Biden administration, which many Egyptian activists charge with facilitating a “genocide" in Gaza. Still, Egypt has been more active than Jordan. Cairo has helped win the release of Israeli hostages and is the only pipeline for whatever aid is getting to the people of Gaza.

Then there are the Saudis, who want to be the region’s most influential power but have not exerted themselves to help Washington. Instead, throughout the conflict, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s primary concern has been to ensure that he does nothing that would provoke the Iranians and undermine the de-escalation that Riyadh and Tehran agreed to under Chinese auspices in March 2023. The Iranians’ demonstrated capacity to sow chaos across the region since Hamas’s attack on Israel has no doubt made an impression on the Saudis. As a result, they have elected to remain on the sidelines, issuing blandishments about a cease-fire and the need to resolve the Palestinian question, even though the combination of Saudi financial resources and influence in Jerusalem would be useful.

For their part, the Emiratis—Israel’s closest partner in the Arab world—want to help but remain skeptical of American efforts. That is because they have found the Israelis to be impervious to advice and are dubious that the Biden administration is willing to pressure the Israelis to negotiate with the Palestinians. Without a resolution to the conflict, the Emirati leadership, which does not have relations with the PA’s Mahmoud Abbas, also refuses to be treated as “the ATM for Gaza’s reconstruction," as one Emirati official derisively quipped. Officials in Abu Dhabi fear any investment in the Gaza Strip will be lost in the next round of conflict between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas. Bahrain’s leaders view the situation similarly, though they have little capacity to act without their larger and wealthier neighbors.

Then there are the Qataris, who along with the Turks have long supported Hamas. It is true that Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani used his good offices to secure the release of 110 hostages in November and recently brokered a deal to provide the remaining ones with medicine. But over the last decade, it was under the nose of a senior Qatari diplomat posted in Gaza and charged with distributing aid and reconstruction funds that Hamas built up its military capabilities. The American plans for the “day after" hinge on the destruction of Hamas, but there is no indication from Doha that it is willing to give up that relationship. The same is true for Turkey, whose leaders have declared Hamas to be a national liberation movement.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that Blinken’s periodic visits to the Middle East have not produced anything. If the Biden administration were more proactive, however, it might have a chance of breaking down regional resistance to its approach.

For starters, U.S. officials could cut the Turks and Qataris out of the process. Both countries seek to enhance their prestige in the Arab and Muslim world by playing both sides of the fence, and they are never held accountable for their solicitous approach toward Hamas. Blinken must drop the fantasy that either Doha or Ankara is prepared to be constructive in the Biden administration’s endgame plans for Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Biden must also be tougher on Abbas. Instead of vague plans about reinvigorating the PA—which could take years—Washington needs to apply pressure on the aging, corrupt and ineffectual leader either to leave now or cede power to a prime minister who can act independently of him and build the political coalitions necessary to run Gaza. It would also be a welcome move among people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Then there is Iran and its “axis of resistance," which has sowed chaos around the region for years. It is hard not to conclude that the escalating violence in the Middle East since Hamas’s October 7 massacre of Israelis is the beginning of a larger conflict that Iran and its proxies have long wanted. It is not too late for Washington to nip this in the bud and take a tougher stand on Tehran. The Iranians see the limited nature of U.S. military operations and incessant statements about not wanting escalation as nothing but American weakness.

Instead of pinprick strikes on the Houthis in Yemen, the U.S. must destroy their ability to target shipping in the Red Sea. More sustained military action against the Houthis would all at once secure freedom of navigation, which is a core American interest, mitigate the Iranian threat and demonstrate to Washington’s partners that it is willing to take decisive action to ensure regional stability.

Of course, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not making it any easier on Biden and Blinken with his wholesale rejection of their postwar vision. That is a problem that could be mitigated, however, if Washington drove developments in the region rather than merely responded to them. If the Biden administration is opposed to another Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, then the best chance for it to realize its goals is to bring Blinken’s listening tours to an end in favor of resolute American action.

Steven A. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.